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SUMMARY
The future of the western industrialized economies, including Canada, depends on healthy
and innovative high-tech sectors. In 2010, this realization spurred the Canadian government
to commission a blue-ribbon panel charged with assessing the state of programs designed
to support business and commercially oriented research and development. The resultant
Jenkins Report contains many useful recommendations aimed at consolidating disparate
offerings, measuring existing initiatives’ performance and fostering federal-provincial
cooperation to improve programs’ impact on the tech sector. However, the Report erred
in overlooking the squandering of government resources on tax subsidies to investors in
Labour-Sponsored Venture Capital Corporations (LSVCCs) — union-sponsored specialized
mutual funds meant to promote the development of high-growth small and mediums-sized
businesses — which are far outperformed by the private sector and often waste capital better
used elsewhere. It is also unduly harsh on the federal Scientific Research and Experimental
Development Tax Credit, which is critical to the early-stage start-ups that give rise to high-tech
giants. In judiciously assessing the Jenkins Report’s recommendations and offering
alternatives, this paper serves as a much-needed corrective, offering policy makers clear
guidance in securing Canada’s economic future.    
PART I: INTRODUCTION
It has become a commonplace to posit that the future of the western industrialized economies,
including Canada, is closely tied to the health of the knowledge-based industries — or the high-
technology sectors of the economy. Moreover, a key component of a healthy high-technology
sector is innovation, which includes a spectrum of activities running all the way from relatively
modest improvements to existing technologies through to the invention of disruptive or radically
new technologies. Many nations are currently engaged in an earnest examination of the ways in
which governments can play a role in fostering innovation within their national borders; Canada
is no exception. In October 2010, the federal government commissioned a blue-ribbon panel,
under the chairmanship of Tom Jenkins, “to conduct an assessment of key programs within the
government’s portfolio of initiatives in support of business and commercially oriented R&D,”
including both direct and indirect governmental support. The committee was instructed to make
revenue-neutral recommendations, so that all recommendations for additional spending were to
be offset by matching recommendations for reductions in other areas.
The Jenkins Report,1 delivered in October 2011, is indeed an important milestone in the
examination of governmental funding of innovation in Canada. The purpose of this paper is to
comment on those recommendations of the committee, which appear to be problematic. These
include the panel’s recommendation to scale back the Scientific Research and Experimental
Development (SR&ED) tax credit, and to devote the resulting savings to the enhancement of
direct funding programs. In addition, I address an issue largely overlooked in the Jenkins
Report: the squandering of both federal and provincial resources on tax subsidies to the largely
unsuccessful Labour-Sponsored Venture Capital Corporations (LSVCCs).
Before proceeding to those aspects of the report, however, it would be a disservice to overlook
the report’s many useful recommendations. In particular, the report suggests that performance
metrics be formulated for the evaluation of the many disparate offerings currently under the
federal umbrella.2 It also sensibly proposes that the large menu of disconnected and often
obscure federal programs be rationalized and consolidated. As the committee opines, this will
furnish an opportunity for a comprehensive review of the efficacy of the many different
programs, in addition to exploiting economies of scale in the delivery of government support.
The committee further suggests that all federal programs be administered by an entity styled the
Industrial Research and Innovation Council (IRIC). IRIC would play a key role in reviewing,
consolidating and administering the various programs. It would also furnish entrepreneurs, often
befuddled and perplexed by the disparate and often obscure menu of offerings, with user-
friendlier one-stop shopping.
The report also notes the extensive overlaps between various federal and provincial programs,
and wisely exhorts the federal government to “engage in a dialogue with the provinces to
improve coordination and impact.” It aptly opines that business innovation should be “one of the
core objectives of procurement.” As the American experience attests, the artful use of
government procurement to support innovation is potentially one of the most potent tools in the
government’s arsenal.3
1 Innovation Canada: A Call to Action (Ottawa: Publishing and Depository Services, Public Works and Government
Services Canada, 2011) (hereafter the Jenkins Report), expert panel commissioned by the federal government to
review federal support for research and development, under the chairmanship of Tom Jenkins.
2 The committee rejects different standards for regional assistance programs. See Jenkins Report, p. 4-2. This is, in
effect, a rejection of regional assistance as a distinct goal of government assistance, at least where innovation is
concerned. In this, I concur.
3 See e.g., Michael Belfiore, The Department of Mad Scientists (New York: Harper, 2009).
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In what follows, Part II of the paper briefly reviews the perilous state of business innovation in
Canada. Part III suggests that both federal and provincial governments end their wasteful
subsidies of the LSVCCs. In Parts IV and V, I critically review the Jenkins Committee’s
recommendations regarding the SR&ED credit and the relative merits of direct and indirect
assistance programs. I suggest that the Jenkins Committee’s lack of faith in the efficacy of
indirect funding via the SR&ED program is misguided. While agreeing with the Jenkins
Committee’s focus on co-funding arrangements for the delivery of direct assistance, I also
suggest that co-funding arrangements have little or no role to play in funding basic and applied
research and early-stage commercialization efforts. Finally, in Part VI, I suggest a change to
the federal taxation legislation that is designed to enhance the profitability of a sale of a
technology business to a foreign strategic acquirer, boosting the prospective profitability of
investment in early-stage businesses.
PART II: THE PERILOUS STATE OF BUSINESS INNOVATION IN CANADA 
As indicated in the Jenkins Report, Canadian support for R&D is high compared to most other
countries in the world.4 Nonetheless, the thrust of the report is that Canada does not do well
when it comes to commercializing research — a conclusion that echoes the findings of many
other reports on innovation in Canada.5 The best evidence that this is the case resides in the
anaemic growth in Canadian labour productivity over the past several decades. As stated in a
report of the Canadian Council of Academies in 2009:6
Canada has a serious productivity growth problem. Since 1984, relative
labour productivity in Canada’s business sector has fallen from more than
90 percent of the U.S. level to about 76 percent in 2007. Over the 1985-
2006 period, Canada’s average labour productivity growth ranked 15th out
of 18 comparator countries in the OECD.
The Jenkins Committee thus concludes that “Canada has a business innovation problem,”7 and
that “Canada’s sub-par productivity growth is largely attributable to relatively weak business
innovation.”8
4 Jenkins Report, Figure 6.1, p. 6-2.
5 See e.g., Canadian Council of Academies, Innovation and Business Strategy: Why Canada Falls Short (2009),
available at
http://www.scienceadvice.ca/uploads/eng/assessments%20and%20publications%20and%20news%20releases/inno/(20
09-06-11)%20innovation%20report.pdf; Expert Panel on Commercialization, People and Excellence: The Heart of
Successful Commercialization. Volume I: Final Report of the Expert Panel on Commercialization (Ottawa: Public
Works and Government Services Canada: 2006); Expert Panel on Commercialization, People and Excellence: The
Heart of Successful Commercialization. Volume II: Supporting Material, (Ottawa: Public Works and Government
Services Canada: 2006); Council of Canadian Academies, The State of Science & Technology in Canada (Ottawa:
CCA; 2006).
6 See Canadian Council of Academies, supra, note 5. The Jenkins Committee concurred. See Jenkins Report, ch.1.
7 Jenkins Report, pp.2-3. See also p.2-4.
8 Ibid.
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This is not merely incidental to Canada’s future. As low-skill high-labour content work
migrates to offshore locales, Canada’s future, like that of other developed countries, lies in the
cultivation of the so-called knowledge-based industries. As the committee puts it, “countries
around the world have recognized the importance of business innovation as the ultimate source
of competitive advantage and increasing prosperity.”9 Particularly as the federal government
spends some $7 billion per annum in an attempt to build an innovative economy, it is thus a
matter of some urgency that the best forms of government support be identified and
implemented, and inefficient or ineffective programs weeded out.
PART III: THE LSVCC PROGRAMS
Overview
The federal and provincial governments should follow Ontario’s lead10 and terminate their
support for Labour-Sponsored Venture Capital Corporations (LSVCCs).11
In Québec, LSVCCs are incorporated pursuant to special acts of the legislature. By contrast,
both the federal government and a number of Canadian provinces have enacted legislation that
allows any person to incorporate an LSVCC, in a manner similar to the incorporation of a
commercial company under general incorporation legislation.12 In contrast to a commercial
corporation, however, an LSVCC is a specialized form of mutual fund. It accepts capital
contributions from individual investors resident in the province of incorporation (except for
federally incorporated funds, which may accept contributions from residents of any province).
Only individuals may contribute to an LSVCC, and these investors are far less sophisticated
then the high-net-worth individuals and institutional investors who capitalize private VC funds.
As in any mutual fund, the fund managers seek to invest the capital contributions in pursuit of
profit (although, as discussed below, the Québec funds have pursued goals other than simple
profit maximization). In theory, LSVCCs are supposed to promote the development of high-
growth small and medium-sized enterprises, and the fund must typically invest a stated
percentage (usually 60 percent) of its capital contributions in such businesses.
Investors in LSVCCs receive generous tax subsidies. Matching tax credits of 15 percent are
paid by the incorporating province and the federal government, for a total tax credit of 30
percent, on investments not exceeding $5,000. Most contributions are equal to or less than
$5,000. Investors typically must hold the investment for at least eight years to earn the tax
credits, although in Québec, investors must hold their shares until retirement.
9 Jenkins Report, pp.1-2.
10 Ontario announced in 2005 that it would gradually phase out the LSVCC tax credit. It will completely disappear in
2012. See http://www.rev.gov.on.ca/en/guides/itrp/lsif.html. 
11 In Québec, LSVCCs are created by special Acts of the legislature. Elsewhere in Canada, anyone may incorporate an
LSVCC so long as they have a union sponsor. The bulk of Canada’s LSVCCs are incorporated in Ontario.
12 These attributes are reviewed in Douglas J. Cumming and Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, “Mutual Funds that Invest in Private
Equity? An Analysis of Labour-Sponsored Investment Funds” (2007), 31 Cambridge J. Econ. 445, and F.
Vaillancourt, “Labour-Sponsored Venture Capital Funds in Canada: Institutional Aspects, Tax Expenditure and
Employment Creation”, in P. Halpern, ed., Financing Innovative Enterprise in Canada (Calgary: University of
Calgary Press, 2007) 571.
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An LSVCC must have a labour union sponsor. Sponsorships are usually secured by a promise
to pay the union a percentage of the net asset value of the fund (usually less than one percent).
This has given rise to the oft-quoted rent-a-union cognomen to describe the arrangement. The
union sponsor receives a special class of shares that allows it to appoint a majority of the
directors of the fund. It thus possesses de jure control of the fund. Despite this, the special
class of shares held by the union is not entitled to receive any dividends or to participate in the
assets of the fund on winding up. Thus, the union’s economic interest is limited to its
sponsorship fee.
Not surprisingly, LSVCCs are not in fact incorporated, promoted, or managed by the union.
Rather, an outside management entity unconnected with the union will incorporate the fund
and approach the union seeking sponsorship. In the typical arrangement, the union will either
contractually or informally cede its power to nominate directors to the management entity,
which will thus possess de jure control of the fund. This arrangement institutionalizes a
perfectly self-perpetuating management structure in which the managers are effectively
insulated from removal by the real owners of the fund — the individual investors who provide
the capital.  
LSVCC promoter/managers have often been bankers, recently graduated MBAs, or others with
little or no experience in venture capital investing. This is troubling, since venture capital is a
hands-on industry in which expertise comes from many hard years of experience with small,
high-tech, potentially high-growth companies.13
While a private venture capital fund is usually organized as a limited partnership with a 10-
year lifespan, an LSVCC is organized as a corporation with perpetual existence. This exposes
investors to the danger that, in the absence of an exit event, the fund will carry overvalued
investments on its books virtually indefinitely. Should this occur, it can result in a serious
overstatement of the fund’s net asset value. Since new investors buy in at the net asset value,
this effectively transfers wealth from new investors to older investors.
This governance structure achieves a virtually perfect separation between ownership and
control. It is an open invitation to high agency costs and poor management.14 Because
ownership is widely dispersed between a large number of investors, each of whom holds a
small stake, collective action and free-rider problems would virtually guarantee that
shareholders would exercise little or no oversight over management even if they were
empowered to appoint a majority of directors.15
13 Cumming and MacIntosh, “Mutual Funds that Invest in Private Equity? An Analysis of Labour-Sponsored
Investment Funds”, ibid.; James A. Brander, Edward Egan and Thomas F. Hellmann, “Government Sponsored
Venture Capital in Canada: Effects on Value Creation, Competition and Innovation”, paper presented at the NBER
Conference on International Differences in Entrepreneurship, held in Savannah, GA, February 1–2, 2008.
14 Cumming and MacIntosh, supra, note 12.
15 Ibid. 
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LSVCCs have limitations on their investment activities that private funds are not subject to.
For example, it is customary for the provincial incorporating legislation to require LSVCCs to
invest only in firms with a majority of employees or net assets in the province of incorporation.
Set against the background of Canada’s relatively diminutive market, this can be a rather
crippling limitation. The success of a high-growth firm will often depend on expanding the
firm’s customer base, marketing operations, and/or manufacturing facilities to other countries.
However, the territorial limits on investments limit the extent to which LSVCCs can participate
in foreign-directed expansion-stage financing for their portfolio companies.
In addition, capital contributions must be invested within stated periods of time following
receipt (the so-called pacing requirements), failing which the fund’s investors may lose their
tax credits. These requirements were adopted in order to prevent funds from indefinitely sitting
on uninvested reserves. Unfortunately, they have created a new problem: funds investing
unwisely or on disadvantageous terms when investment deadlines approach.
Numerous papers document the poor performance of LSVCCs as an asset class. The largest,
Solidarity, has a 20-year return that is just slightly more than half what one would have earned
by continually rolling over 91-day treasury bills.16 This is representative of the performance of
LSVCCs as an asset class through the decades of the 1980s and 90s, in which LSVCCs as a
whole earned less than short-term t-bills.17 In fact, LSVCC managers actually appear to be
value-destructive. The higher the proportion of a fund’s assets in equity, the lower the fund’s
return.18
Private venture capital fund managers charge a combination of a fixed fee, averaging about two
percent of the net asset value of the fund, and carried interest, which is typically 20 percent or
more of the increase in the value of the portfolio (usually payable only over and above a hurdle
rate of return). Successful private managers make the lion’s share of their profits from the
carried interest; the fixed fee covers only the costs of administration.19 By contrast, while
LSVCC managers also charge both fixed fees and carried interest, they earn most of their
return in the form of fixed fees. These fees are greatly in excess of those charged by private
fund managers, averaging about four percent, and in some cases exceeding 10 percent. LSVCC
managers charge these high fixed fees both because the small size of LSVCC funds does not
allow for the exploitation of economies of scale in administration, and because they do not
generate sufficient increases in portfolio value to earn carried interest.20
16 See GlobeAdvisor.com, at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/funds-and-
etfs/funds/summary/?compareBench=6339&FromMonth=10&FromYear=1984&ToMonth=12&ToYear=2011&id=28
577&symbol=&style=na_eq&profile_type=ROB.
17 See e.g. Cumming and MacIntosh, supra, note 12.
18 Cumming and MacIntosh, supra, note 12.
19 William A. Sahlman, “The Structure and Governance of Venture Capital Organizations” (1990), 27 Journal of
Financial Economics 506.
20 Cumming and MacIntosh, supra, note 12.
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Comparative returns data for LSVCCs and private funds are difficult to obtain. The Canadian
Venture Capital Association (CVCA) has never published any returns data that segregate
LSVCCs from other funds.21 Recently published CVCA survey returns data22 covering the
2001-2011 period segregates the sample of respondent firms into “Captive/Evergreen” funds
and “Private Independent Funds.” According to the CVCA, the captive/evergreen category
represents “a broad constituency which includes Captive and Retail Fund managers, Corporate
subsidiaries and other industry and government agencies [sic].”23 This category thus digests all
public, private, and hybrid venture capital funds other than private independent funds. It
reports returns on a gross basis, versus a net basis for private independent funds.24 In addition,
it calculates returns for investee companies only, rather than returns on the fund’s entire
portfolio of assets (versus returns to investors for private independent funds). For all of these
reasons, a comparison between returns realized by captive/evergreen funds and private
independent funds sheds little light on the comparative performance of LSVCC and private
independent funds.
It is noteworthy, however, that the CVCA reports the net 10-year return of private independent
funds to be -3.1 percent, versus a gross return of -2.3 percent for captive/evergreen funds. If a
notional three percent management fee is deducted from the gross returns of captive/evergreen
funds,25 the aggregate performance of these funds lags that of private independent funds by
2.2 percent over the past 10 years. There is reason to believe, however, that the performance
21 Early performance studies, reporting on fiscal 2001-2004, lump all funds together in a single category. These studies
are potentially misleading for at least two reasons. First, they compute performance for portfolio holdings only and
do not take into account the influence of cash holdings or other non-portfolio assets within an entity. See
http://www.cvca.ca/files/Resources/2001_Performance_Study.pdf. Since LSVCC funds hold significant portions of
their assets in cash, the overall returns to venture investing are overstated. Second, these studies report gross, rather
than net returns. They therefore fail to take into account the negative effect on overall performance of the high
management fees charged by LSVCC funds. For fiscal 2005 and going forward, the CVCA switched to reporting
returns on a net basis. However, the methodology for doing so differs for different fund types. For private
independent funds “the net returns are calculated from the cash flows between funds and their outside investors.” See
http://www.cvca.ca/files/Resources/CVCA_Press_Release_Performance_Study_December_2005_Final.pdf, note 9.
However, for all other funds, “the returns are based on the cash flows between the investment fund and the portfolio
company” with a synthetic management fee of 2.5 percent and carried interest of 20 percent on the increase in value
of the portfolio. Ibid. Since LSVCC funds retain high cash balances and other non-venture assets, this gives an
inflated picture of LSVCC returns. A further change in methodology occurred in 2008, in which captive/evergreen
funds were reported separately from private independent funds, with the captive/evergreen fund category including
all funds save for private independent funds. This methodology has been carried through to the most recent report
(covering fiscal 2010) and is discussed immediately following.
22 See CVCA, “Canadian Venture Capital & Private Equity Industry: Performance Data – Captive/Evergreen Funds,
December 13, 2011, available at
http://www.cvca.ca/files/News/Q2_11_CVCA_Performance_Public_Release_Captive.pdf. 
23 See “Canadian Venture Capital & Private Equity Industry: Performance Data – Captive/Evergreen Funds”, May 28,
2009, available at
http://www.cvca.ca/files/Downloads/Q4_08_CVCA_Performance_Public_Release_FINAL_CAPTIVE.pdf. 
24 See CVCA, “Canadian Venture Capital & Private Equity Industry: Performance Data – Private Independent Funds”,
December 13, 2011, available at
http://www.cvca.ca/files/News/Q2_11_CVCA_Performance_Public_Release_Private_Independent.pdf
25 This is the same percentage used by Hellman and Schure in attempting to put the returns of LSVCCs and
captive/evergreen funds on a similar footing for direct comparison. See Thomas Hellman and Paul Schure, “An
Evaluation of the Venture Capital Program in British Columbia”, Ministry of Small Business, Technology, and
Economic Development, British Columbia, June, 2011. It is likely to understate the aggregate of management fees,
since it fails to account for the carried interest that would have been deducted from returns by funds experiencing
positive returns, had they been set up as private independent funds.
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differential between LSVCC and private independent funds is greater than this. Using a dataset
covering the period from 2001 to 2009, Hellman and Schure26 compare the performance of
British Columbia-based retail funds with the performance of captive/evergreen funds, and find
that the captive/evergreen funds outperformed their sample of retail funds.27 This suggests that,
if LSVCC funds were segregated from the other funds that make up the CVCA’s
captive/evergreen category, they would underperform private independent funds by something
in excess of the overall captive/evergreen’s underperformance of 2.2 percent.
Perhaps the most persuasive evidence, however, that LSVCCs underperform private
independent funds arises from a paper by Brander et al.28 Using a dataset covering the period
from 1992 to the first quarter of 1998, Brander et al. find that Canadian private independent
venture capital funds outperformed LSVCCs by a large and statistically significant margin of
28-42 percent.  
The dismal performance of LSVCCs reflects the lack of managerial expertise of LSVCC
managers. At least in the case of the Québec LSVCCs, it also reflects the fact that the statutes
creating LSVCCs impose multiple mandates that extend beyond generating profits for their
investors.29 While funds outside of Québec have generally claimed that they focus on
profitability, the Québec funds have eschewed profitability in favour of promoting regional
development and labour union agendas.30
The Jenkins Committee observes that smaller funds are less likely to perform well,31 a concern
also reflected in the BDC’s Venture Capital Industry Review, published in early 2011.32 The
BDC report presents data suggesting that the best performance is realized by funds in the range
of $200-300 million.33 The vast majority of LSVCCs have assets that are far less than this
optimal size. Even the larger funds that initially appear to lie in the optimal range (or in excess
thereof) divide their assets under administration into a large number of small funds, rather than
pooling investment capital together in a single fund. Thus, any performance advantage that size
might have conferred is lost.
26 Hellman and Schure, ibid. The study evaluates the combined performance of the single LSVCC registered in BC (the
Working Opportunity Fund, managed by GrowthWorks), and three BC-registered retail Venture Capital Corporations,
with an analogous statutory framework to LSVCCs but for which the 30 percent tax credit is paid entirely by the BC
government. See Hellman and Schure, p.10. I thus refer to these in the text as retail funds, rather than LSVCCs.
27 Ibid. at 38. It is difficult to evaluate the magnitude of the underperformance of LSVCC funds for a number of
reasons. The captive/evergreen category itself includes LSVCC funds. Obviously, the inferior-performing LSVCCs
would drag down the relative performance of the benchmark, understating the extent to which LSVCCs
underperform captive/evergreen funds. In addition, the Working Opportunity Fund holds assets other than venture
capital assets. Hellman and Schure report that in 2009 the Working Opportunity Fund held seven percent of its assets
in bonds and 23 percent “in what boils down to the TSX Composite Index.” Ibid. at 37.
28 J.A. Brander, R. Amit, and W. Antweiler, “Venture capital syndication: improved venture selection versus the value-
added hypothesis’ (2002), 11 Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 423.
29 See e.g., Cumming and MacIntosh, supra, note 12.
30 D. Osborne and D. Sandler, “A Tax Expenditure Analysis of Labour-Sponsored Venture Capital Corporations.”
(1998), 46 Canadian Tax Journal 499; Douglas J. Cumming and Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, “Venture Capital Exits in
Canada and the United States” (2003), 53 University of Toronto Law Journal 101. This is discussed further below.
31 Jenkins Report, pp. 7-15 to 7-17.
32 BDC, Venture Capital Industry Review (BDC, February 2011).
33 Ibid. at 13.
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Thus, for example, Covington manages in excess of $300 million in capital. However, this is
divided between five master funds, most of which are in turn composed of a number of smaller
funds. By way of illustration, one of the master funds — the Covington Venture Fund — is
itself composed of five constituent funds.34
Similarly, the $430 million in capital managed by GrowthWorks is divided between the Working
Opportunity Fund, the GrowthWorks Canadian Fund (no longer available for purchase because
of illiquidity), the GrowthWorks Commercialization Fund, and the GrowthWorks Atlantic
Venture Fund. In turn, each of these is composed of a number of constituent funds. The Atlantic
Venture fund, for example, is divided into a Balanced Series, with $25 million in net assets, the
GIC Series, with $1.29 million in net assets, the Growth Series, with $0.95 million in assets, and
the Financial Services Series, with $1.4 million in net assets. The largest of the GrowthWorks
funds — the GrowthWorks Canadian fund, with some $224 million in aggregate assets — is
divided into 19 different constituent funds. Needless to say, none of these constituent funds falls
within the optimal size range noted in the BDC report.
The comparatively poor returns of small funds are due to a number of factors. For one, it often
forces the fund to make an initial investment that is smaller than the investee firm requires,
inhibiting growth. It can also interfere with the fund’s ability to attract credible and
experienced syndication partners, and prevents the fund from exploiting economies of scale in
administration. Finally, it inhibits the extent to which a fund can make follow-on investments,
without which the investee firm may flounder or expire.  
As noted in the BDC report on venture capital in Canada, the problem of small fund size is not
unique to LSVCCs.35 However, the LSVCC programs encourage the division of capital pools
into small funds for marketing purposes, in order to appeal to constituencies of investors with
different risk/return preferences. Thus, for example, the GrowthWorks Canadian Fund markets
a Canadian & Merger Series, a GIC Series, a Growth Series, an Income Series, a Financial
Services Series, and a Diversified and CMDF Reinvestment Series.36
The LSVCCs would be less inclined to relentlessly sub-divide their portfolios into seemingly
endless varieties of offerings if the negative effect that this has on returns inhibited fund
raising. However, as the following discussion makes clear, the returns experienced by LSVCC
funds have little or no influence on their ability to raise new capital.
Investments in LSVCCs are tax-driven. As noted, generous tax credits are paid on investments
of up to $5,000, and most investments are of this amount or less. Potent evidence of the tax-
driven nature of the LSVCCs is that, contrary to the typical experience with mutual funds, the
ability of a given LSVCC to raise funds from retail investors is disconnected from its rate of
return.37 This is reflective of the fact that LSVCCs are invariably marketed (and purchased) on
the basis of the tax credits. This can be seen by perusing various LSVCC websites, which
typically offer either little or selective historical data on returns. The selling point is invariably
the tax credits.
34 The Series I, II, III funds: the Series IV fund; the Series V fund; the Series VI fund; and the Series VII, VIII, IX
fund. See Covington Group of Funds, 2011 Annual Report.
35 BDC, Venture Capital Industry Review (BDC, February 2011), p.13.
36 See GrowthWorks Canadian Fund, 2011 Annual Financial Statements.
37 Cumming and MacIntosh, supra, note 30. See also BDC, Venture Capital Industry Review (BDC, February 2011),
p.17.
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A primary motivation for the generous LSVCC tax credits has been to bulk up the Canadian
venture capital industry. However, the evidence is that they have failed to do so. LSVCC funds
grew rapidly in the 1990s, to the point where they constituted a large percentage of Canadian
VC capital under administration. Nonetheless, the evidence is that this growth came at the
expense of more efficient private funds.38 This crowding-out phenomenon is a consequence of
two factors. First, the tax credits paid to LSVCC investors give the LSVCC funds a lower cost
of capital than private funds. The LSVCCs have therefore been able to outbid private VCs in
respect of promising investments. Second, the large sums of capital under administration by
LSVCCs have made this crowding-out phenomenon pervasive. This has diminished the returns
of private VCs and played a key role in driving pension funds and other furnishers of capital to
private funds to the sidelines.39
Are the Québec-Based Tax-Subsidized Funds Really Venture Capital?
In this section I discuss three large Québec-based funds that receive generous tax subsidies.
Two are LSVCCs (Fonds de solidarité FTQ, and Fondaction), while the third — Desjardins
Venture Capital — is not. Investors in Desjardins, however, receive a generous tax credit from
the province of Québec that is about the same as the combined tax credit paid to LSVCC
investors by the province of Québec and the federal government. While all of these three funds
are nominally venture capital funds, they are in fact nothing of the sort.
FONDS DE SOLIDARITÉ FTQ
The single largest venture capital fund in Canada is the Fonds de solidarité FTQ (hereafter
Solidarity). Solidarity’s audited financial statements as of May 201140 indicate that of total
assets of $8.8 billion, only $4.27 billion — about half — are Development Capital Assets. The
balance of $4.2 billion (so-called Other Investments) is invested in shares in public companies
($1.5 billion), hedge fund units ($216 million), bonds ($2.30 billion), and money-market
instruments ($154 million). Of the whopping $2.30 billion in bonds, more than two-thirds (69
percent) are bonds of governments and government agencies, the majority of which have
maturities ranging from five to 30 years. None of these Other Investments could remotely be
called venture capital.
Does this, nonetheless, indicate that $4.27 billion — the Development Capital Assets (DCA)
— are venture capital? Not at all. True venture capital investments are, virtually by definition,
investments in private companies. However, unlisted shares and units comprise only 49 percent
of all DCA, or about 25 percent of total fund assets.41 That puts a rough upper bound on the
proportion of Solidarity assets that are true venture capital.42
38 Douglas J. Cumming and Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, “Crowding Out Private Equity: Canadian Evidence” (2006), 21 J.
Bus. Venturing 569.
39 Cumming and Macintosh, ibid; James A. Brander, Edward Egan and Thomas F. Hellmann, “Government Sponsored
Venture Capital in Canada: Effects on Value Creation, Competition and Innovation”, paper presented at the NBER
Conference on International Differences in Entrepreneurship, held in Savannah, GA, February 1–2, 2008.
40 Fonds de solidarité FTQ, Financial Statements, 2011.
41 The balance is listed shares and units and both secured and unsecured loans, bonds, and advances.
42 The financial statements do not indicate what proportion of debt instruments are convertible. If there is a significant
proportion, the ceiling could be higher than 50 percent.
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However, further inspection reveals that the figure is almost certainly much smaller. Private
venture capital investments are overwhelmingly in technology companies. But of the $4.27
billion of Solidarity invested in DCA, only 20.7 percent are investments in technology, when
measured at cost,43 and 15.3 percent when measured at market value.44 Comparable or greater
amounts are invested in each of several traditional industries, including manufacturing and
primary extraction ($1.07 billion by cost, and $987 million by market value), services and
tourism ($1.46 billion by cost, and $1.7 billion by market value), and regional or local and real
estate funds ($780 million by cost, and $930 million by market value).
Two other indicia typical of private capital investments are that they are equity45 investments
made at a comparatively early stage of a company’s existence.46 However, an unknown
proportion (possibly as great as half) of the technology investments in Solidarity’s portfolio are
non-equity investments such as non-convertible debt instruments, credit facilities, project
financing, and guarantees.47 Added to this, there is no way to tell what proportion of the
technology investments are early- or expansion-stage investments; the overwhelming
proportion may be later-stage technology investments.48 Making the generous assumption that
half of the technology investments are true venture capital, only about 10 percent of DCA is
venture capital, or about five of total fund assets.
It is probably more accurate to say that none of Solidarity’s direct investments are venture
capital. As outlined in Appendix A, the term venture capital describes a wide-ranging complex
of agency relationships and incentive structures that extends well beyond the characteristics of
the investee firms. Some of the key characteristics are as follows.
A private venture fund is typically operated as a limited partnership (LP) that is wound up after
10 years. The limited lifespan of the fund means that failed investments cannot indefinitely be
carried (and concealed) on the balance sheet. At some point, all investments are exposed to the
judgment of the market, creating an accurate accounting of the manager’s performance over the
life of the fund. This plays an important role in disciplining the venture managers.
The venture manager will typically retain 20 percent or more of the increase in the value of the




45 I include in equity any residual claim on the company’s earnings stream (and assets on winding up), and any claim
(such as convertible preferred shares or debt) that is convertible into a residual claim.
46 Venture capitalists do not typically invest at the very earliest stage (i.e., the seed stage) of a company’s existence,
which roughly encompasses the time from the initial idea to marketing the company’s first products. Rather, venture
capital investments are typically made in early- and expansion-stage companies, which roughly include companies
that have already marketed their first commercial products to companies with demonstrated market traction that seek
additional funds to expand production, development, distribution, and/or marketing.
47 See Fonds de solidarité FTQ, Financial Statements, 2011, Notes to Financial Statements, note 4 (Developmental
Capital Investments), note 1 (defining funds committed but not disbursed) and note 2 (indicating that such
investments may be in the form of a guarantee).
48 Conversation with Éric Legault, Managing Partner, Teralys Capital.
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VC managers typically have an extended skill set (outlined in Appendices B and C) not
possessed by any other type of equity investor save skilled business angels. They are also
extremely active investors. Aside from representation on the board of directors, a VC manager
will usually be in close contact with the firm’s principals, supplying advice and direction on an
informal basis, and will play a key role in shaping high-level strategy.
Even when not holding a majority stake, a VC (or syndicate of VCs) will carefully craft their
contractual relationship with investee firms to give themselves the power to make or veto key
decisions, hire and fire management, and ultimately to play a role similar to that of a
controlling shareholder. These contracts are also designed to incentivize the entrepreneurs of
investee firms, by requiring entrepreneur to earn their stake in the firm by meeting various
performance metrics (so-called sweat equity), providing for repurchase options should the
entrepreneurs leave the firm or not meet performance targets, or by other means.
Private VCs usually syndicate their investments. This increases the intellectual firepower
brought to bear in the selection of investments, in addition to the quality and quantity of
oversight during the term of the investment.49
Solidarity investments — like those of most other LSVCC funds — lack most or all of these
factors. Unlike a private fund, Solidarity has a perpetual existence. Its investment managers are
salaried employees with a limited stake in the success of the companies that they fund. Lacking
the extended skill set of private investors, they contribute little to building value in the
business. Even if they were to possess the contractual levers of private investors, lacking the
appropriate skills, they would be unable to use them effectively to create value. In addition,
relatively few of Solidarity’s investments are syndicated, sacrificing the benefits of syndication
noted above.
In fact, despite the “LSVCC” tag, Solidarity was never really intended to be a venture capital
fund. The product of a deal between the Québec Federation of Labour and the government of
Québec, the fund was designed to serve a multitude of purposes that have essentially nothing
to do with venture capital. These include: encouraging blue collar workers in Québec to invest
in small and medium-sized Québec businesses; allowing these workers to participate in the
growth of the economy; giving workers a shareholder’s perspective on running a business;
promoting economic development in depressed regions of Québec; acting as a funding source
of last resort to keep Québec businesses afloat in hard times; and supporting unionized
enterprise and contributing to labour peace in Québec. What Solidarity was not created to do
was to invest primarily in the type of firm favoured by private VCs: potentially high-return
technology firms with commensurately high risk.  
Solidarity’s recent history is instructive. Precisely because its (limited) attempts to engage in
venture capital have not succeeded, Solidarity has essentially vacated the field. It now places a
small portion of its assets with Montreal-based private fund-of-funds manager Teralys. In turn,
Teralys places the money with a selected group of private venture capital funds either operating
in Québec, or investing in Québec-based companies.
49 While syndicates will usually designate a lead VC, the other members of the syndicate will also supply useful
oversight and direction.
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Solidarity’s decision to vacate the venture capital field and place a small portion of its funds
with a private fund-of-funds manager has been matched by two other major governmental
institutional investors in Québec: the Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec and
Investissement Québec. These three Québec governmental entities initially placed $600 million
with Teralys,50 recently supplemented by an additional $700 million. Assuming that Solidarity’s
share is 1/3 of the aggregate commitment, that means that about $430 million of Solidarity’s
portfolio is true venture capital. That constitutes about 5.2 percent of Solidarity’s assets as of
May 31, 2011.
FONDACTION
Solidarity is not the only legislatively created LSVCC in Québec. A second LSVCC,
Fondaction,51 has similar multiple statutory objectives. Its prospectus states that:
Under the Act, the main functions of Fondaction are:
• to promote investments in enterprises by investing directly in order to create, maintain
or protect jobs of by guaranteeing or standing surety for any obligation contracted by
them;
• to foster the development of [eligible enterprises] by inviting working men and women
and other community resources to participate in their development by subscribing for
shares of the Fund;
• to develop the management skills of the working men and women in worker-controlled
enterprises and facilitate their active involvement in the economic development of
Québec;
• to help enterprises conform to environmental laws and regulations; to foster the
development of environmental policies within enterprises.52
Needless to say, these objectives have very little to do with what may truly be called venture
capital. Indeed, Fondaction’s financial statements read very much like those of Solidarity. Of
Fondaction’s assets of $877.6 million as of May 31, 2011, it would appear that, like Solidarity,
no more than five percent is true venture capital.
50 http://www.teralyscapital.com/who-we-are, and conversation with Éric Legault, Managing Partner, Teralys Capital.
51 The full name is “Fondaction, le Fonds de développement de la Confédération des syndicats nationaux pour la
coopération et l’emploi.” Investors in Fondaction receive tax credits even more generous than those in Solidarity: a
25 percent provincial tax credit and a 15 percent federal tax credit, for a combined credit of 40 percent. As with
Solidarity, investors must hold their shares until retirement.
52
“Simplified Prospectus Relating to the Offer of Class “A” Shares Series 1 and Series 2 of Fondaction, Le Fonds de
Développement de la Confédération des Syndicats Nationaux pour la Coopération et l’Emploi”, December 20, 2011,
available at http://www.fondaction.com/pdf/prospectus/2011PROSPECTUS%20_ANG.pdf, p.1. Section 1.3 of the
prospectus further states, inter alia, that the mission of Fondaction is “development of the management skills of the
working men and women in worker-controlled enterprises and to facilitate their active involvement in the economic
development of Québec.” 
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DESJARDINS VENTURE CAPITAL
As of December 31, 2010, Desjardins Venture Capital (DVC), a wholly owned subsidiary of
the Desjardins Group, had $1.04 billion under management. DVC is the asset manager for
Desjardins Capital regional et cooperatif (DCR),53 whose dual mission is “promoting the
economic development of Québec cooperatives and regions.”54 To this end, a large part of its
business activity consists of buying Québec businesses and turning them into worker
cooperatives. Once again, the business of DCR is not in any sense true venture capital.
In fact, DCR’s financial statements disclose that it had a higher proportion of its assets (57
percent) in “Other Investments” (bonds, money market instruments and preferred shares) than
either Solidarity or Fondaction.55 Of $955 million average assets under administration in 2010,
$86 million, or nine percent, are identified as either “technological innovations” or “venture
capital — health”. However, as with other Québec governmental funds, we can have no
confidence that all or perhaps any of this represents true venture capital.56
Effect on Industry Statistics
The Canadian Venture Capital Association (CVCA) maintains industry statistics on the state of
venture capital in Canada. The CVCA classifies about 20-25 percent of Solidarity’s assets as
venture capital.57 This means that of the $14.9 billion of venture capital that the CVCA
indicated were under management in Canada in 2010,58 Solidarity accounted for about $1.6-2.0
billion. As indicated, a more accurate figure would be $430 million. Thus, the CVCA
overstates Solidarity’s venture portfolio by some $1.17 to $1.57 billion.
For similar reasons, it would appear that the venture portfolios of Fondaction and DVC are
overstated — the former by $131-175 million, and the later (conservatively) by about $100
million. The combined overstatement for Solidarity, Fondaction, and DVC is thus on the order
of $1.4-1.85 billion, or roughly 9.4-12.4 percent of the CVCA’s portfolio of venture capital.
53 DVC also serves as investment manager for Desjardins-Innovatech S.E.C. and Capital croissance PME S.E.C.
However, the latter is a subsidiary of DCR, and the former is a joint venture of DCR and the Québec government.
Thus, for practical purposes, DVC has a single client — DCR.
54 2010 Annual Financial Report, Desjardins Capital regional et cooperatif, p.4. The report further states (at p.5):
The Company’s mission is to:
- Contribute to Québec’s economic development and take an active part in the growth of the following regions:
Abitibi-Témiscamingue, Bas-Saint-Laurent, Côte-Nord, Gaspésie -Îles-de-la-Madeleine, Mauricie, Nord-du-
Québec and Saguenay – Lac-Saint-Jean (the resource regions);
- Inject development capital into companies and cooperatives and provide expert advice to support their start-
up, growth and expansion; and
- Generate returns that will encourage shareholders to reinvest
55 DCR 2010 Annual Financial Report, p.13, available at
http://www.capitalregional.com/En/references/documents/2010_Rapportfinancier_annuelANG.pdf).
56 These two categories together contributed 0.1 percent of DCR’s gross return of 5.4 percent return in 2010, and -1
percent to its gross return of 5.5 percent in 2009. Ibid. p.11.
57 Conversion with Gilles Duruflé, Vice President of the CVCA.
58 http://www.cvca.ca/files/Downloads/2010_CVCA_Liquidity_2001-2010.pdf.
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This overstatement leads to a somewhat misleading picture of where Canada’s venture capital
industry stands on the world stage. For example, the 2009 Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
ranks 31 countries on the percentage of GDP devoted to venture capital.59 Using the revised
figures drops Canada from 8th to 12th place. Particularly given the importance of CVCA
statistics in informing government policy, the government should urge the CVCA to restate
their figures more consistently with the analysis indicated above.
Implications for the Design of Government Programs Aimed at Fostering Innovation
Tax subsidized venture capital funds in Québec have very little to do with either venture capital
or promoting innovation. Rather, the roughly $1.85 billion in tax credits paid by the federal
government to Solidarity and Fondaction investors60 has mostly subsidized investments in: i)
publicly traded securities, bonds (the majority of which are government bonds), credit facilities
and other loans, hedge funds, money-market instruments, and derivative securities; ii) regional
development; iii) companies in traditional industries that have nothing to do with the
development of new technologies or innovation. The tax credits paid by the federal government
effectively represent a hidden equalization payment directed to Québec from the rest of
Canada. The beneficiaries of this equalization payment are retail investors situated in Québec,
Québec businesses — particularly in outlying regions, and the Québec Federation of Labour
(Solidarity’s union sponsor).
Are Other (Non-Québec) LSVCCs Really Venture Capital?
Outside of Québec, any person may incorporate an LSVCC under provincial legislation, as
long as the fund has a union sponsor. The majority of non-Québec LSVCCs have been
incorporated in Ontario. Like their Québec counterparts, these LSVCCs earn a combined 30
percent provincial and federal tax credit — although in 2005, Ontario announced that it would
be phasing out its tax credit. It will fully disappear in 2012.61
59 John Bosma and Jonathan Levie, “Global Entrepreneurship Monitor: 2009 Report.” Canada did not participate in the
2010 survey.
60 At first pass, a rough lower bound on the tax credits paid to Solidarity investors is $1.2 billion – or 15 percent of the
current portfolio of $8 billion in assets. While the federal government did not pay tax credits until May of 1985
(following the second year of operation), the assets of Solidarity were only $14 million after its first two years of
operation. See http://www.caledonia.org.uk/papers/Québec-solidarity-fund.pdf (data reportedly derived from
Solidarity Annual Report 2003). Thus, the failure to pay tax credits in the first two years of operation has a de
minimis impact on the estimated lower bound. This estimate is unquestionably too low, however, given that current
assets under management do not represent all contributions, since some contributors have reached the age of
retirement and cashed out. Wikipedia reports that the total investments since inception are $10.8 billion. See
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fonds_de_solidarit%C3%A9_FTQ. This would establish a lower bound on the federal
contribution of about $1.62 billion. In addition, however, between 1985 and 1996, the federal government paid a tax
credit of 20 percent. See Ayi Ayayi, “Good News, Bad News: Lessons Learned from the Canadian Labour-Sponsored
Venture Capital Corporations”, presented at CESifo conference “Venture Capital, Entrepreneurship, and Public
Policy,” CESifo Conference Centre, Munich, 22-23 November 2002. In June of 1996, Solidarity’s total assets were
$1.76 billion. See http://www.25ansfondsftq.com/PDFs/rapportannuelfonds96.pdf. Thus, a more accurate estimate of
the federal tax expenditure is $1.7 billion ($350 million between 1985 and 1996, and $1.35 billion between 1996 and
the present).
With respect to Fondaction, the fund has been in existence for only 10 years. For this reason, the number of
redemptions effected will be small (since investors normally have to wait until retirement to cash out), and a fair
estimate of the federal tax credits is thus about $150 million.
61 See http://www.rev.gov.on.ca/en/guides/itrp/lsif.html. 
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At least superficially, non-Québec LSVCCs (“NQ” funds) more closely resemble private
LSVCCs. For example, like their private counterparts, the managers receive a fixed fee that
nominally covers administrative expenses, in addition to carried interest based on the increase
in the net asset value of the portfolio. The similarity with private funds, however, is mostly
cosmetic. Although NQ managers have portfolio assets that more closely resemble those of
private managers, they nonetheless lack the skill set of private venture managers and have
largely been incapable of growing their retinue of portfolio companies into larger companies,
generating weak or even negative returns.62 Because of their lower cost of capital, they have
driven more efficiently run private venture capital firms from the market.
The returns realized by the NQ funds are not materially different from those of the Québec
funds. GrowthWorks Canadian Fund, one of the GrowthWorks-managed stable of funds and
one of the largest NQ funds (with gross assets of approximately $225 million63) is illustrative.
The top-performing fund in the GrowthWorks Canadian Fund group of funds in the three years
preceding February 2012 realized a return of 8.7 percent,64 compared to 27.3 percent for the
S&P/TSX Index65 and 30.1 percent for the Astra Canadian Small Cap Equity Index.66 The
arithmetic mean return of GrowthWorks Canadian Fund’s 29 funds with three-year returns data
is -6.84 percent, yielding a whopping -34.1 percent when compared to the S&P/TSX Index,
and -36.9 percent when compared to the Astra Canadian Small Cap Equity Index.
The management expense ratios for GrowthWorks’ funds are equally shocking, ranging from
3.85 percent to an astonishing 7.64 percent, with an arithmetic average of 5.66 percent.67
GrowthWorks Canadian Fund’s woes go well beyond poor returns, however. With insufficient
liquidity to meet investor demand for redemptions, it suspended its redemptions in November
2011, indicating that it would entertain requests for redemptions on a semi-annual basis, but
leaving it to the board of directors to determine the quantity of redemptions at each semi-
annual interval.68
62 Cumming and MacIntosh, supra, note 12.




64 GrowthWorks Commercialization 09. See
http://www.morningstar.ca/globalhome/industry/fundtable.asp?quick=finder&currview=2&Sponsor_ID=158137&Fun
d_Type=*&RRSP=*&load_struct=*&total_asset_value=*&Expense_Ratio=*&Rating_3y=*&sort1=R3y&findord=&
top=50&Submit2=Show+Funds&nodata=0. Morningstar’s figures include the performance of the Working
Opportunity Funds, which are managed by GrowthWorks (even though Working Opportunity files separate financial












Overall, some of the GrowthWorks-managed portfolio of funds consists of assets that are
similar to those targeted by private venture capitalists.69 However, others could only loosely be
styled venture capital.70
If, as the BDC states, the Canadian venture capital industry is broken, the first step that must
be taken to repair the damage is to end the LSVCC subsidies, and allow private venture
capitalists to retake the Canadian venture capital landscape. In order to allow for an orderly
wind-down of the LSVCC funds, the tax credits should be phased out over a period of several
years, as Ontario has done.71
Looming Disasters in the Works?
Most private funds are organized as limited partnerships with a 10-year lifespan. These funds
typically invest their committed capital in the first three or four years of the fund’s life. In the
balance of the 10-year lifespan, the venture capitalist’s energies are devoted to husbanding and
nurturing their entrepreneurial firms so that a profitable exit may be effected prior to the fund’s
termination date. Importantly, once the 10-year horizon is reached, all fund assets must be sold,
and the proceeds distributed to investors.72 The 10-year horizon thus serves an effective
disciplinary function. While the VC might be able to carry overvalued investments on its
balance sheet for years, when its lifespan expires, it simply cannot hide from the market’s
disinterested verdict on the true worth of its portfolio investments.
By contrast, LSVCCs are organized as corporations with an unlimited lifespan. This means
that, under normal accounting rules, as long as an investee firm does not go bankrupt, it can be
carried on the fund’s balance sheet at cost virtually indefinitely, no matter its real market
value.73
The collapse of Manitoba’s LSVCC Crocus Fund is illustrative. Investment valuations were
initially conducted by staff, which then forwarded valuation recommendations to a Valuation
Sub-committee of the Board. Even though the committee was assisted by an external valuation
expert, however, many of Crocus’s investments in non-traded companies were carried on the
69 For example, the assets of the Venture Series, by category, are as follows: Information Technology 55.3 percent; Life
Sciences 25.9 percent; Cleantech 15.9 percent; and Other 2.9 percent. In addition, like many private funds, many of
the fund’s investments are made at relatively early stages of development. The breakdown is: Seed/Pre-Clinical Stage
2.6 percent; Early/Clinical Stage 72.3 percent; Later Stage 25.1 percent.




70 Working Opportunity’s Commercialization Series, for example, is heavily weighted toward later stage investments.
Working Opportunity Fund 2010 Annual Financial Statements, ibid.
71 Ontario announced in 2005 that it would phase out its LSVCC tax credit by 2011. This was subsequently extended to
2012. There is obviously a balance to be struck between ending a program that, in net, has damaged venture capital
markets, and not inflicting excessive losses on retail investors who have put money into the LSVCC programs.
72 In some cases, rather than selling and distributing cash, the fund will distribute shares in its investee firms in kind.
73 This is a consequence of the usual accounting rule that, absent a subsequent market transaction, the value of an asset
is shown on the balance sheet at historical cost.  
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fund’s books at serious overvalues for a period of years (with no adverse comment from the
fund’s auditor).74 After vigorously battling allegations related to overvaluations (including
suing at least one newspaper making such an allegation), in late 2004 the board suspended
trading in Crocus’s shares and remitted the entire portfolio to an external valuation. When the
dust settled, the restated value of the portfolio was about half the posted net asset value prior to
the suspension of trading. Crocus ended up in insolvency proceedings. Its directors,
underwritings, auditor, external valuation expert and others were the subject of a number of
actions on behalf of its investors (all ultimately settled, many with substantial payouts). Its
directors were also the subject of regulatory proceedings by the Manitoba Securities
Commission (also ultimately settled).75 The behaviour of the fund’s directors and its valuation
practices were the subject of a scathing report by the Attorney General of Manitoba.  
In response to this problem, Canadian securities regulators now require all labour-sponsored
funds to secure an independent valuation of their portfolio investments in connection with the
release of each set of annual financial statements.76 While this is a welcome regulatory
development, it should not be understood to be a complete solution to the problem of
overvaluation. The valuation of private companies is never an easy task. Particularly for larger
funds, it is difficult or impossible to perform a meaningful valuation of all of the private
companies in the portfolio on a yearly basis (indeed, the Crocus board was assisted by an
external valuation expert). In addition, nominally independent valuators will no doubt be
concerned to earn a repeat engagement the following year. Their tendency will thus be to err on
the side of conservatism in proposing downward revisions, while adopting a more enthusiastic
posture in relation to upward revisions. Without any market transaction to supply a truly
independent benchmark as to value, the requirement for an independent valuation is thus a far
from bulletproof protection for investors.
LSVCCs sell shares to investors on the basis of net asset value, as derived from the balance
sheet. If the balance sheet figure is overstated, new investors will purchase their shares at an
overvalue. Because new cash flows in at an unrealistically high valuation, this effects a
subsidization of old investors by new investors. 
74 See the Settlement Agreement between the Manitoba Securities Commission and the former directors of Crocus,
available at http://www.msc.gov.mb.ca/legal_docs/orders/6414_crocus.pdf, in addition to the staff allegations
pertaining to the proceedings before the commission: In The Matter of: the Crocus Investment Fund: Statement of
Allegations of Staff of the Manitoba Securities Commission, available at
http://www.msc.gov.mb.ca/legal_docs/investigation/hearings/crocussoa.html. The fund’s auditor made no adverse




76 National Instrument 81-106: Investment Fund Continuous Disclosure. Part 2.1 contains a baseline requirement that
the annual financial statements of an investment fund contain a statement of net assets, a statement of changes in net
assets, and a statement of investment portfolio as of the end of each financial year. Part 3.1.2 further requires that the
statement of net assets disclose the current value of each of the fund’s investments. Part 3.5(5) requires that the
statement of investment portfolio disclose the current value of each portfolio asset. Part 8 applies exclusively to
labour-sponsored funds. It exempts an LSVCC from disclosing the current value of each investment in its portfolio
as long as it discloses (inter alia) the individual cost of each investment, the total current value of each investment,
and the total adjustment from cost to current value for all venture investments, and provided that the fund “has
obtained an independent valuation relating to the value of the venture investments or to the net asset value of the
fund” (part 8.2(c)). The instrument further defines an independent valuation as “a valuation of the assets and
liabilities, or of the venture investments, of a labour-sponsored or venture capital fund that contains the opinion of an
independent valuator as to the current value of the assets and liabilities, or of the venture investments” (part 1.1).
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PART IV: THE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTAL DEVELOPMENTAL
(SR&ED) TAX CREDIT
The Jenkins Panel’s Antipathy to the SR&ED
The SR&ED tax credit is the single largest program directed at encouraging innovation,
delivering about $3.5 billion in benefits to something like 24,000 businesses annually.77 This
constitutes more than half of all federal funds directed toward innovation.78
The SR&ED has a refundable component, pursuant to which the government reimburses
businesses undertaking innovative research for 20 percent of their qualifying expenditures,
whether or not the firm has taxable income. If the firm is a Canadian-controlled private
corporation (CCPC), the reimbursement rate is 35 percent on the first $3 million of qualifying
expenditures and 20 percent on the excess.
The Jenkins panel recommends that SR&ED-eligible expenditures be restricted to labour costs
only, eliminating reimbursement for non-labour expenses such as capital costs and overhead.79
While also recommending an offsetting increase in the reimbursement rate, the panel suggests
that this rate gradually be reduced over time, with the savings transferred to programs
delivering direct forms of assistance such as grants. The panel also suggests that these changes
be restricted to CCPCs, with consideration given to eventually extending them to generally
larger non-CCPCs.
Much of the panel’s antipathy to the SR&ED is based on Department of Finance research
concluding that within five years of incorporation, only about two percent of all firms
receiving SR&ED money grow into large firms that continue to undertake R&D.80 For this
reason, the committee suggests that much of the government’s SR&ED largesse is directed at
firms that are unlikely to succeed in the commercialization sweepstakes (i.e., the program has a
low degree of target efficiency). There are a number of problems, however, with this reasoning.
A Response to Jenkins
NO COMPARISON TO DIRECT ASSISTANCE FAILURE RATES
The significance of the two percent figure cannot be evaluated without comparison to the
growth rates of firms receiving direct assistance. No such comparison is offered. 
77 Jenkins Report, p.3-3; p.6-5.
78 The Jenkins panel estimates that the total federal expenditure on innovation is $6.44 billion. See Jenkins Report, p.3-
3.
79 Jenkins Report, p.6-10.
80 Jenkins Report, p.6-12.
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A COMPARISON TO SILICON VALLEY SURVIVAL AND GROWTH RATES
The two percent in five years figure is derived from data in the 2000-2004 period81 — that is,
the period immediately following the bursting of the high-tech bubble in March of 2000. It is
well documented that high-tech failure rates are generally higher in post-bubble periods,82 and
were in fact higher in the post-2000 period than in any other historical period.83 Thus, a pivotal
datum underlying the committee’s views regarding the SR&ED is derived from
unrepresentative data.
It is interesting and informative to compare the failure rates of firms born in Silicon Valley, the
world’s premiere high-tech incubator, over a similar period of time.84 A study by Luo and
Mann indicates that more than two-thirds of the high-tech companies founded in Silicon Valley
in 2000 (in which a record amount of venture capital money was poured into Silicon Valley
businesses) were no longer in business by 2004.85 By 2009, fewer than one in five were still in
business.86 Few survivor firms grew substantially. In 2000, the 2,600 high-tech businesses
founded in that year had aggregate employment of 27,000 workers. By 2009, that had shrunk
to 9,400 for the entire cohort.87 Among the firms that survived to 2009, average employment
only doubled.88
Since firms receiving SR&ED assistance are overwhelmingly small CCPCs, it is instructive to
look at the growth and survival rates of comparable Silicon Valley firms founded in 2000. Only
17 percent of the small firms (those with four employees or fewer when founded) founded in
2000 survived to 2009,89 despite “the mammoth amounts of venture capital investment in
Silicon Valley during and around the year 2000.”90 On average, these survivor firms
approximately doubled their employment. Thus, the average small firm that survived ended up
as a medium-sized firm as defined in the study (5-49 employees). A similar percentage of firms
that were medium-sized in 2000 survived to 2009. Of the survivors, average employment grew
by 50 percent; thus, fewer than half of the initially medium-sized firms ended up as large firms
as defined in the study (50 or more employees). Based on these figures, it would appear that no
more than four percent of small and medium-sized Silicon Valley firms founded in 2000 went
on to become large firms by 2009, or ten years after the commencement of the data period.
81 Jenkins Report, p.6-12: “Analysis by the Department of Finance of start-ups created over the 2000–2004 period
indicates that, within five years following incorporation, approximately two percent of innovative start-ups grow into
large firms that continue to undertake R&D.”
82 See e.g. Yuji Honjo, “Business failure of new firms: An empirical analysis using a multiplicative hazards model”
(2000), 18 J. of Industrial Organization 557 (bubble failure rates generally higher for start-up firms).
83 See e.g. Tian Luo and Amar Mann, “Survival and Growth of Silicon Valley high-tech businesses born in 2000,” Sept.
2011 Monthly Labor Review 16. Much of the inferior performance was due to two factors: poor macroeconomic
performance in the 2000-2008 period (and in particular 2001-2003, and 2008), and the industry mix of firms funded
in 2000. The firms examined in the Department of Finance study were subject to similar macroeconomic factors,
although the industry mix of Canadian firms may well have been somewhat different (given the generally greater
concentration of Silicon Valley firms in this period in information technology). The performance of the year 2000
cohort relative to the benchmark is overstated due to the fact that the record amounts of venture capital invested in
2000 were not taken into account in specifying the performance benchmark.
84 The Luo and Mann study is restricted to firms founded in 2000, while the Department of Finance study examines
firms founded in 2000-2004. Nonetheless, the two studies are broadly comparable.
85 Luo and Mann, supra, note 83.
86 Ibid. at 18.
87 Ibid. at 18.
88 Ibid. at 19.
89 Ibid. at 19.
90 Ibid. at 22.
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Thus, the extraordinary fact is that, of the high-tech firms created in the world’s leading high-
tech incubator in 2000, many of which had generous venture backing, about the same
percentage grew into large firms over 10 years as those firms receiving Canadian SR&ED
assistance over five years. This puts a rather different complexion on the two percent in five
years figure relied upon by the Jenkins Committee as a central datum in its conclusion that the
SR&ED program has low target efficiency.  
SUCCESSFUL FIRMS MAY NEVER GROW INTO LARGE FIRMS
Firms that Licence Their Technology
Firms engaged in successful R&D may not grow into larger firms within five years — or
indeed ever. Rather, they may choose to become coupon clippers and license their technology
to larger market actors. Firms that engage in this strategy will never grow into large firms, even
though they may generate significant technological advances and considerable profits for their
owners.
In fact, it is commonplace for university technology transfer departments to encourage
university researchers to licence their technology, rather than take the much bigger gamble of
building the enterprise into a manufacturing company.
Firms Bought Out in an M&A Transaction
Most successful entrepreneurs and early-stage investors will ultimately seek to monetize their
investments via either an initial public offering or a sale of the entire firm to a third party —
typically a much larger strategic acquirer that seeks to meld the target’s technology with its
own.91 Evidence compiled by the CVCA indicates in the past several years M&A exits (or sales
of the entire firm to a third party) have been the dominant form of exit taken by Canadian
venture capital-backed companies. Between 2003 and 2010, there were 47 exits of VC-backed
companies via initial public offerings, versus 248 M&A exits.92
By definition, when a small firm sells out to an acquirer, it will never grow into a large firm.
Despite this, the data indicates that the average M&A exit is very profitable for entrepreneurs
and early-stage investors (and possibly the most profitable form of exit for Canadian
companies).93 Thus, the fact that only two percent of SR&ED recipients grow into large
companies within five years of incorporation does not seem to tell us very much about whether
the SR&ED money was well spent.
91 Cumming and MacIntosh, supra, note 12; Ronald J. Gilson and Bernard S. Black, “Venture Capital and the Structure
of Capital Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets” (1998), 47 J. Fin. Econ. 243.
92 See “Canada’s Venture Capital Industry in 2009,” Thomson Reuters, p.33, available at
http://www.cvca.ca/files/Downloads/Final_English_Q4_2009_VC_Data_Deck.pdf, and “Canada’s Venture Capital
Market in 2010,” Thomson Reuters, p. 32, available at
http://www.cvca.ca/files/Downloads/Final_Q4_2010_VC_Data_Deck_English.pdf. 
93 Cumming and MacIntosh, supra, note 12.
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THE FIVE-YEAR TIME HORIZON IS TOO SHORT
Venture capitalists typically anticipate an investment horizon of three to eight years before they
exit their investments — the shorter end of the spectrum generally being reserved for later-
stage investments.94 Since VCs will tend to invest several years after start-up, this means that
(aside from software developers, for which product development times are relatively short)
many high-value technological breakthroughs spend 10 or more years in the lab before hitting
it big, even with venture capital backing. RIM (a venture-backed company), often seen as one
of Canada’s great innovation successes, took longer. Though founded in 1984, it was not until
1999 that RIM hit pay dirt with the introduction of the BlackBerry. E-Ink, which developed the
technology underlying most e-readers, began its commercialization journey in 1995, but the
first e-readers did not hit the shelves until 2005, a full 10 years later (and with the benefit of
some $140 million of venture capital funding). Using the panel’s metric, both RIM and E-Ink
would have been judged to be failures undeserving of government funding.
THE SR&ED AS A BRIDGE ACROSS THE VALLEY OF DEATH
In 2007 (the last year in which there is complete data), 20,000 CCPCs received SR&ED
payments averaging $65,000 per firm.95 This implies average SR&ED-eligible expenditures of
about $185,000 per firm. The aggregate SR&ED payment to these 20,000 firms was $1.3
billion96 — not very far off the estimated size of Canada’s annual angel investment. However,
much of that angel money flows to non-high-tech businesses.97 Thus, it seems very likely that a
large portion of the 20,000 CCPCs receiving SR&ED monies were mostly or entirely funded
by the firm’s entrepreneur, family and friends. Some would have received angel investment
too, but very few would have received funds from venture capitalists or strategic partners,
which (as the Jenkins Report recognizes98) generally come in quite a bit further down the road.
Few, if any, would have received funding from mezzanine lenders or merchant banks. By
definition, no CCPC would have tapped into the public capital markets. All of this implies that
the bulk of firms receiving SR&ED money are very early-stage firms developing speculative
technologies that would normally be expected to have high failure rates.
This might be taken as confirmation of the Jenkins Committee’s view that, because the
SR&ED has low target efficiency, it should be scaled back in favour of direct assistance. Such
a conclusion should be staunchly resisted, for two reasons. One is that these firms are the
acorns from which mighty oaks grow. The analogy is particularly apt insofar as very few
acorns grow into mighty oaks, just as very few small CCPCs will develop game-changing
technologies and/or grow into industrial giants. However, if all of the acorns are scoured from
the forest floor, we can be quite confident that we will get no mighty oaks at all.
94 Cumming and MacIntosh, supra, note 12.
95 Jenkins Report, p.6-5.
96 Ibid.
97 See e.g. Equinox Management Consultants Ltd., Informal Equity Capital for SMEs: A Review of Literature, prepared
for Industry Canada, March, 2000.
98 See Jenkins, Figure 7.1, p. 7-12.
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That these firms have a low probability of success is fully consistent with the view that many
are engaged in cutting-edge research. Indeed, virtually by definition, firms operating at the
cutting-edge will have a low probability of success. If they did not, they could not be said to be
at the cutting-edge (or the bleeding edge, as it is sometimes called). Without cutting-edge
research, where are the commercializable technologies to come from?
The second reason why the SR&ED should not be scaled back because of high failure rates is
that, aside from money from friends, family, and an irregular assortment of angels, SR&ED
money is likely to be the only money available to small CCPCs. Such firms are often said to
inhabit the Valley of Death, a gap in funding that exists between public funding of early-stage
pre-commercial research, and later-stage private funding furnished by venture capitalists,
strategic partners, mezzanine lenders, merchant bankers, and public capital markets. As
explained by Murphy and Edwards:99
....the availability of public sector funds decreases abruptly after the
technology is created because the public sector views subsequent investment
as the purview of the private sector. This drop-off of public investment
occurs at the same time that the investment needs of the venture are actually
growing. Hence, the entrepreneurial venture must often turn to equity
financing for at least part of the resources needed. Further, adequate levels
of angel and seed investor resources are often not available as a precursor to
venture capital, especially for high technology. This is why we call the
region between the technology creation stage and the early
commercialization stage the cash flow valley of death.
The existence of the Valley of Death is an artefact of high information asymmetries. That is, it
is very difficult for potential outside funders to evaluate the firms’ technology, management
team, and market opportunities. That is precisely why venture capitalists and other private
investors tend to shy away from seed-stage investments, and hence why the Valley of Death
exists.
Increased direct funding to early stage firms is not the answer. If highly skilled private
investors cannot pick winners and losers, can we truly expect government bureaucrats to do
so? If the goal is to enhance target efficiency, transferring funds from the SR&ED to direct
funding is not likely to accomplish this goal.
In summary, the SR&ED credit, at least insofar as it provides assistance to smaller firms,
should be left untouched. Such firms are an indispensable part of the innovation ecosystem. In
the absence of private funding or effectively targeted public funding, we must be prepared to
offer a high degree of leverage to early stage money via the SR&ED program — even in the
knowledge that much of this research will ultimately fail to produce a commercializable
product or service.
99 Lawrence Murphy and Peter Edwards, “Bridging the Valley of Death,” Innovation: America’s Journal of Technology
Commercialization, 2(3), June/July 2004, available at http://www.innovation-america.org/bridging-valley-death. 
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INTRINSIC MARKET DISCIPLINE
While the panel evinces concern that SR&ED is not well targeted, it is important to point out
that SR&ED has a built-in market discipline. In order to claim the SR&ED, someone has to
invest the other 65 percent of the funds (80 percent for firms that are not Canadian-controlled
private corporations). That money will be lost if the research bears no fruit. That supplies a
potent incentive to make sure that the research has a decent chance of succeeding. Indeed, the
tax credit portion of the SR&ED is only available to firms that have taxable income. These
firms have the best form of market certification possible — customers. 
BUREAUCRATIC SIMPLICITY, FAVOURABLE TIMELINES, AND RELATIVELY MODEST OPPORTUNITY
COST
In addition, since SR&ED does not require a bureaucratic assessment of merits, the risk of
applying is far less. This is a far from trivial advantage. For a human-capital-constrained start-
up, the opportunity cost of applying for funds can be very significant, as critical employees are
pulled away from the research and cast into the sometimes bottomless pit of filling out forms
and engaging with grant personnel. The prospect of expending material time and effort, with
nothing to show for it, can act as a significant deterrent to applying.
The SR&ED is also much faster than most direct assistance programs. While SR&ED credits
are typically processed in four to six months,100 it is not unusual for successful applicants in
granting competitions to wait a year or more before receiving a cheque. As Elon Musk
(Paypal’s co-founder) has stated, starting a company is like staring into the face of death.101 For
high-tech start-ups, a year is more like a century.
RESTRICTING SR&ED TO LABOUR COSTS UNLIKELY TO MATERIALLY REDUCE APPLICATION COSTS
The motivation for restricting SR&ED to labour costs is to reduce the complexity of applying
for the SR&ED, which, according to the panel, “leads to increased reliance on third-party
consultants to prepare R&D claims.”102 The panel’s survey results suggest that these costs
average 14 percent of the value of credits for small firms, and five percent for large firms.
It seems unlikely, however, that restricting SR&ED-eligible expenditures to labour costs will
substantially reduce the burden of applying for the SR&ED, nor reliance on third-party experts
such as accountancy firms. Computation of non-labour costs is only one of many reasons why
SR&ED applications can be time-consuming and expensive. The revenuers must be satisfied
that the work in question aims at improving a product or process via an experimental approach,
and that there is technological uncertainty. A myriad of documents is required. On both counts,
the involvement of an experienced hand greases the wheel — someone who knows from
experience how to draw up a satisfactory project report, what questions are likely to arise, and
how to go about answering them. Reducing the eligibility base to labour costs is unlikely to
make it more practical for entrepreneurs to apply on their own.
100 Jenkins Report, p.6-6, supplemented by conversations with SR&ED recipients.
101 http://techcrunch.com/2011/09/14/elon-musk-starting-a-company-is-like-staring-into-the-face-of-
death/?utm_source=pulsenews&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Techcrunch+%28TechCrunch%29.
102 Jenkins Report, p.6-11.
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Nor would the diminished application cost make anything like a sea change in the quantum of
net proceeds flowing to SR&ED-eligible firms. If the Jenkins Report is correct in asserting that
applying for the SR&ED costs the average CCPC 14 percent of its SR&ED proceeds, and the
average larger firm five percent, the total costs of applying are on the order of $300 million.103
What is up for grabs is not the entire cost of applying, but the marginal cost reduction that
would result from restricting eligibility to labour costs. Supposing that this change results in a
25 percent reduction in application cost, that would reduce aggregate application cost by $75
million. That is a scant two percent of aggregate SR&ED funding. This modest figure scarcely
seems to compel the conclusion that a major change in the eligibility base is warranted.
TILTING THE PLAYING FIELD IN FAVOUR OF FIRMS WITH HIGH LABOUR/CAPITAL RATIOS AND
LARGER FIRMS
Reducing the SR&ED to labour costs (coupled with increasing the reimbursement rate) would
significantly tilt the playing field in favour of industries with high labour to capital ratios (such
as software development) and against others with low labour to capital ratios (just about
everything else). This tilt cannot be justified from any defensible policy perspective. Nor will it
sit well with provinces — and in particular Ontario and Québec — where a great deal of
capital-intensive R&D takes place, making it a political hot potato.
As the Jenkins Panel would confine the change in eligible expenses to CCPCs, there would
also be a tilt in the playing field in favour of large firms, at the expense of smaller upstarts.
This will have the effect of entrenching larger firms in their particular market niches, reducing
competition, and almost certainly reducing the rate of innovation.
DIFFERENCES IN SECTORAL WEIGHTINGS BETWEEN DIRECT AND INDIRECT SUPPORT
The Jenkins Report helpfully summarizes the distribution of both direct and SR&ED assistance
by industrial sector.104 There are material differences in the two forms of assistance. For
example, 9.8 percent of all direct assistance in 2010-2011was paid to Agriculture, Forestry,
Fishing and Hunting, while only 1.4 percent of the SR&ED credits paid in 2007 (the last year
in which there is complete data) went to this sector. The comparative figures for Oil and Gas
Mining are 3.8 percent (direct) and 8.7 percent (SR&ED). For Professional, Scientific and
Technical Services, they are 11.6 percent (direct) versus 23.6 percent (SR&ED). Overall,
Goods Industries received 71.7 percent of direct funding, but only 55.8 percent of SR&ED
funding. Service Industries received 27 percent of direct funding, but 44 percent of SR&ED
funding.
Without making any evaluation of the relative merits of these different weightings, the simple
point is that if funds are transferred from the SR&ED to direct funding, this will have a
material impact on the sectoral distribution of government largesse (and will do so even if no
changes are made in SR&ED-eligible expenses and/or reimbursement rates). There will be
winners and losers. Without exploring the reasons for these differences in sectoral allocations
and their policy rationales, it is impossible to say whether this would be a good thing, a bad
thing, or some mixture of the two. However, prior to acting on the Jenkins recommendations, it
103 This is based on figures provided in the Jenkins Report, p.6-8.
104 Jenkins Report, Figure 3.5, at p. 3-13.
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would be prudent for the government to undertake such an analysis. It would also be prudent
for the government to prepare for the vigorous protests that are likely to issue from those
sectors whose oxes are gored by re-allocating money from SR&ED to direct assistance.
REGIONAL AND SECTORAL BIAS IN DIRECT FUNDING
The SR&ED credit applies agnostically across all firms regardless of size or industrial sector,
while granting programs are often directed at particular industrial silos. The desirability of the
broader approach is specifically endorsed by the committee, which states that “firms and
entrepreneurs [should be empowered] to make market-driven investment decisions according to
their own timelines and regardless of sector, technology or region.”105 This approach is
reflected in the operating principles for the committee’s proposed Industrial Research and
Innovation Council (IRIC), an overlord agency that would oversee all federal assistance for
innovation.106 It is also reflected in the committee’s strongly held view that regional funding
programs should require applicants to meet precisely the same funding requirements as
national programs.107
While endorsing an industry-, technology- and region-agnostic approach to funding, the
Jenkins Committee overlooks the fact that direct funding lends itself much more readily to
political interference. The OECD views this distinction as of central importance in defining
direct versus indirect assistance:
In practical terms, the main distinction between direct and indirect support is
that the latter is open ended and is available to all firms, whereas the former
is limited in overall funding and is allocated by program administrators to
specific projects, industries or regions. Direct support can therefore be
targeted to specific areas, contrary to more neutral indirect measures.108
The Jenkins Panel estimates that 14 percent of direct expenditure in support of business
innovation is regionally oriented.109 By population, this spending is far from even-handed. The
Maritimes, for example, with 6.8 percent of the Canadian population,110 receives 8.4 percent of
all federal direct spending (including NRC institutes located in the Maritimes).111
105 In full, the Jenkins Report states:
The Panel believes that the foundational core of the federal suite of business innovation programs should be
large national programs of broad application — for example, the SR&ED program and Industrial Research
Assistance Program (IRAP) — that support business innovation activity generally, empowering firms and
entrepreneurs to make market-driven investment decisions according to their own timelines and regardless of
sector, technology or region.” Jenkins Report, p.4-2.
106 Jenkins Report, p.5-11.
107 Jenkins Report, p.4-2.
108 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Measuring Innovation: A New Perspective” (Paris:
OECD, 2010), cited in the Jenkins Report, p.6-3.
109 This includes the Atlantic Innovation Fund (4.4 percent), the Western Diversification Program (4.9 percent), the
Business and Regional Growth Program (Québec) (3.4 percent), the Northern Ontario Development Program (0.3
percent), and the Applied Research and Commercialization Initiative (0.1 percent). Jenkins Report, p.3-4.
110 Statistics Canada, http://www40.statcan.gc.ca/l01/cst01/demo02a-eng.htm. 
111 The Atlantic Innovation Fund (4.4 percent), the Business Development Program (0.9 percent), Institute for Marine
Biosciences (NRC) (1.1 percent), Institute for Ocean Technology (0.7 percent), Institute for Information Technology
(1.3 percent).
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The BDC, which is the primary target of the Jenkins Committee’s plan for enhanced direct
assistance, exhibits a strong regional bias in favour of Québec and the Maritimes. With only 23
percent of the Canadian population, Québec receives 32.5 percent of all BDC loans and an
astonishing 49.2 percent of all BDC subordinate financing investments. With 6.8 percent of the
Canadian population, the Maritimes receives 10.7 percent of all BDC loans and 10.2% percent
of all subordinate financing investments.  
By contrast, with 38 percent of the Canadian population, Ontario receives only 30.1 percent of
all BDC loans112 and 24.5 percent of subordinate financing investments.113 The four western
provinces (BC, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba) are also underrepresented. While
accounting for 30.9 percent of Canada’s population, they receive only 25.5 percent of BDC
loans and 15.8 percent of all subordinate financing investments.114
It is difficult not to believe that political agendas drive these figures, and that the BDC and
other nominally national programs have been, and continue to be, used as tools of political
favouritism to confer benefits on some regions of the country at the expense of others. If the
Jenkins Report’s recommendation to strip money from the SR&ED credit and give it to BDC is
implemented, it will only strengthen the regional bias of federal direct funding.
It is also likely to strengthen the sectoral bias of federal funding. Over 20 percent of federal
largesse is directed at a mere three industries: aerospace (10.1 percent);115 forest products (5.7
percent);116 and agriculture (5 percent).117 In addition, various sector-oriented NRC institutes
collectively account for 18.4 percent of all federal direct spending.  
Thus, while recognizing the virtues of an industry-, region-, and technology-agnostic approach
to funding, the Jenkins Committee’s primary recommendations are likely to cause federal
funding to depart more strongly from this objective.
112 BDC Annual Report 2011, p.78.
113 Ibid. p.79.
114 Ibid. p.79. In addition, as documented earlier, the Québec-based LSVCC funds, with many billions of dollars under
administration, exist for purposes unrelated to fostering innovation. These programs are driven primarily by regional
development and union employment, and have received billions of dollars in federal support.
115 The Strategic Aerospace and Defence Initiative (7.6 percent), Space Technology Development Program (0.5 percent),
Institute for Aerospace Research (NRC) (2.0 percent).
116 FPInnovations (5.2 percent), FPInnovations – Canadian Wood Fibre Centre (0.5 percent).
117 Agricultural Bioproducts Innovation Program (1.1 percent), Canadian Agri-Science Clusters (0.8 percent),
Developing Innovative Agri-Products (0.4 percent), Agricultural Bioproducts Innovation Program (1.0 percent);
Canadian Agri-Science Clusters (0.4 percent), Developing Innovative Agri-Products (0.4 percent), Plant
Biotechnology Institute (NRC) (0.9 percent).
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Three Alternatives to Jenkins
REDIRECT SECTOR-FOCUSED FUNDING TO ADVANCED MANUFACTURING
If federal funding is to be sector-oriented, this orientation should, above all, be directed toward
advanced manufacturing. The President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology
(PCAST) defines advanced manufacturing as:
a family of activities that (a) depend on the use and coordination of
information, automation, computation, software, sensing, and networking,
and/or (b) make use of cutting-edge materials and emerging capabilities
enabled by the physical and biological sciences, for example
nanotechnology, chemistry, and biology. This involves both new ways to
manufacture existing products, and especially the manufacture of new
products emerging from new advanced technologies. We believe that
advanced manufacturing provides the path forward to revitalizing U.S.
leadership in manufacturing, and will best support economic productivity
and ongoing knowledge production and innovation in the Nation.
Economists have only recently come to understand that advanced manufacturing is an integral
part of a well-functioning innovation ecosystem. It has become an article of faith to think that
while the process of innovation is central to the future of western economies, manufacturing
can (and should) be effected in cheaper offshore locales. Pisano and Shih argue that this
conventional wisdom is sometimes correct, but just as often wrong. For one thing, when
manufacturing is exported, so are high-tech jobs, depriving the local economy of the ability to
innovate. For another, co-location of manufacturing and R&D may be an essential ingredient in
the innovation process.118 This is likely to be the case, they argue, if product design and
production processes are difficult to modularize or disentangle. It is also likely to be the case
where production techniques are immature and hence in a state of rapid flux, so that product
and process are difficult to separate. Consequently, “an explicit focus on manufacturing is
essential to innovation policy — especially since the exodus of any manufacturing that’s tightly
linked to product design is certain to pull R&D abroad as well.”119
It is important to recognize that outsourcing does not necessarily involve going offshore; firms
may outsource to domestic producers as well. This is an important intermediate option.
Building a manufacturing facility can be both time-consuming and expensive, and will usually
require a major new round of funding. Particularly if the manufacturing process is complicated,
it will take time and a great deal of managerial effort, in an area outside of the firm’s core
118 Gary P. Pisano and Willy C. Shih, “Does America Really Need Manufacturing?” (2012), 90 Harvard Business
Review 94. See also Gary P. Pisano and Willy C. Shih. “Restoring American Competitiveness” (2009), 87 Harvard
Business Review 114; Erica R.H. Fuchs and Randolph Kirchain, “Design for Location: The Impact of Manufacturing
Offshore on Technology Competitiveness in the Optoelectronics Industry,” 56(12) Management Science 2323; David
Rotman, “Can We Build Tomorrow’s Breakthroughs?” MIT Technology Review, January/February 2012.
119 Pisano and Shih, “Does America Really Need Manufacturing?” ibid.
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expertise, to replicate the expertise of market incumbents.120 Building manufacturing facilities
can also greatly enhance the firm’s systematic risk by increasing its financial and/or operating
leverage. In can also expose the firm to an added technological risk — i.e., the danger that its
manufacturing facilities will be rendered obsolete by process innovations introduced by
competitors. Thus, many start-up firms will choose to outsource their production work.
But while both domestic and offshore outsourcing avoid the above-mentioned perils, only
domestic outsourcing allows the firm to retain some measure of geographic proximity to its
production facilities, and hence some ability to exploit research/production synergies. In short,
the existence of a multi-dimensional high-tech manufacturing sector is an important ingredient
in fostering innovation by technology start-ups.
It is also an important consideration for governments that invest heavily in promoting
innovation. If the absence of domestic production options causes recipients of government
support to relocate outside the country, the benefits of this subsidization accrue primarily to
foreigners. 
The importance of a domestic advanced manufacturing sector inspired the President’s Council
of Advisors on Science and Technology to recommend the adoption of a $500 million funding
facility to be set aside for an “advanced manufacturing initiative.”121 The importance of
advanced manufacturing has also been recognized by European governments, at least three of
which have, for example, funded the establishment of domestic biomanufacturing facilities in
order to protect their earlier investments in biotech start-ups.122
How does this fit into the direct versus indirect debate? The Jenkins Report indicates that 52.7
percent of all direct assistance goes to manufacturing, compared to 44.5 percent of SR&ED
money. Thus, one might initially presume that direct funding is more likely to achieve the goal
of supporting advanced manufacturing. However, there is no reason to believe that this is the
case. SR&ED funding is directed in a relatively focused fashion at the kind of innovation that
is characteristic of advanced manufacturing, since qualifiers must demonstrate that they aim at
improving a product or process via an experimental approach. By contrast, as noted above,
direct assistance programs are heavily influenced by regional funding objectives.  
A material proportion of direct assistance is also sectorally oriented in areas that cannot be
styled advanced manufacturing. While a good many of the NRC institutes appear to operate in
the advanced manufacturing space,123 a large portion of other direct assistance does not,
including the 20 percent of total direct assistance flowing to aerospace, forestry and
agriculture. These, and other sectoral allocations to industries such as fishing and hunting,
construction, and utilities, are all disproportionately supported by direct assistance.
120 This expertise extends not only to the production process, but to the sourcing of raw materials, the location and
preferences of customers, distribution channels, potential strategic relationships, marketing techniques, knowledge of
the competitive landscape, and many other factors.
121 
“Report to the President on Ensuring American Leadership in Advanced Manufacturing,” Executive Office of the
President, President’s Council of Advisors in Science and Technology, June 2011, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/pcast-advanced-manufacturing-june2011.pdf. 
122 Peter Vermij, “Governments backing manufacturing to save start-ups,” Bioentrepreneur 28 April 2005, available at
http://www.nature.com/bioent/2005/050401/full/bioent860.html. 
123 For example, the Biotechnology Research Institute, the Institute for Microstructural Sciences, the Institute for
Biological Sciences, the National Institute for Nanotechnology, the Steacie Institute for Molecular Sciences, and the
Institute for Chemical Process and Environmental Technology.
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In addition, many federal and provincial programs that deliver direct funding are concentrated
in funding silos such as those dedicated to green or renewable energy companies. As the
President’s Council’s definition of advanced manufacturing makes clear, however, advanced
manufacturing is concentrated in industry-agnostic platform technologies. A good example is
nanotechnology — the science of manipulating matter at the molecular or atomic scale.124
Nanotechnology is capable of fundamentally altering the basic properties of both familiar and
exotic materials, producing new classes of materials with a virtually infinite range of uses. As a
platform technology, it is widely expected that nanotechnology will have applications in
everything from medicine to industrial processes to consumer goods as widely divergent as
personal computers and tennis balls.125 However, at present, nanotechnologies that cannot
fortuitously be squeezed into a funding silo tend to fall through the cracks. 
It is imperative that the federal and provincial governments focus on advanced manufacturing
as a fundamental determinant of government assistance — be it direct or indirect. Pending a
detailed examination of the relative merits of direct and indirect assistance in supporting
advanced manufacturing, however, it is probably safe to assume that the SR&ED program is
more likely to advance the cause of advanced manufacturing than are direct assistance
programs.
BASE DIRECT ASSISTANCE FLOWING TO EXPERIMENTAL DEVELOPMENT PRIMARILY ON THE
SR&ED CREDIT AND ANGEL SIDECAR FUNDS
The Jenkins Committee classifies federal direct funding programs along the lines suggested by
the OECD’s Frascati Manual.126 These are basic research, applied research, experimental
development, and commercialization. Basic research, by definition, involves no
commercialization objective. Applied research “is also original investigation undertaken to
acquire new knowledge,”127 but “is directed primarily towards a specific aim or objective.”128
It might thus be thought of as pre-commercial research; that is, research that might ultimately
generate a possible commercial application. Experimental development, by contrast, typically
has a specific commercialization objective in mind.
The report observes that “the great majority of R&D performed by business is for experimental
Development”,129 and that “allocation of the SR&ED tax credit, averaged over 2000-07, is 
124 A nanometer is a billionth of a meter.
125 See generally the Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies, which identifies nanotechnology inventions currently in
use as well as those that we might expect to see in the future; http://www.nanotechproject.org/index.php?id=18. 
126 Jenkins Report, p.2-5. The panel adopts the following definition from the Frascati Manual: Proposed Standard
Practice for Surveys on Research and Experimental Development (Paris: OECD, 2002), p.30: 
Basic research is experimental or theoretical work undertaken primarily to acquire new knowledge of the
underlying foundation of knowledge and observable facts, without any particular application to its use in view.
Applied research is also original investigation undertaken in order to acquire new knowledge. It is, however,
directed primarily towards a specific aim or objective. Experimental is systematic work, drawing on existing
knowledge gained from research and/or practical experience, which is directed to producing new materials,
products or devices, to installing new processes, systems or services, or to improving substantially those already
produced or installed.
127 Frascati Manual, ibid.
128 Ibid.
129 Jenkins Report, p 3-11 (citing Statistics Canada, Science Statistics: Industrial Research and Development, 2005 to
2009. Cat. no. 88-001-X (Ottawa, Statistics Canada, 2009)).
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estimated to be mostly in support of experimental development.”130 However, direct assistance
spans all research categories, as follows (based on figures from 2010-11): basic research —
$195 million; applied research — $516 million; experimental development — $573 million;
and commercialization — $162 million.131 From these figures, it can be seen that there is a
substantial overlap between the SR&ED and direct assistance: approximately 45 percent of the
direct funding that is allocated to research goes to experimental development.
Basic and applied research, as well as experimental development, are all important parts of the
innovation ecosystem. While basic research neither aims at, nor will typically result in a
specific commercializable application, it is nonetheless a forerunner and necessary complement
to applied research and experimental development. Because the private sector will not typically
have a presence in either basic or applied research, the government has a special and
irreplaceable role in funding both. The modus operandi for funding in these domains should be
(as is presently the case) academic peer review. Academic peer review provides a solid
decision-making foundation that maximizes target efficiency by giving the decision-making
lead to highly knowledgeable experts in the field.  
The domain of experimental development is quite different. Those engaged in experimental
development are focused quite specifically on developing a commercializable application from
a particular technology. The decision of how best to allocate government funds necessarily
transcends mere science. It depends as well on a keen knowledge of the many and varied
factors that play a role in assessing commercial potential, such as cost and revenue
information, the competitive landscape, market structure, consumer demand, potential strategic
partners, possible sources of funding, marketing strategies, distribution channels, product life
cycles, exposure to systemic risk, and so on. For this reason, market-based assessments of
potential are certain to be more reliable than those made by governments.
This is true even where governments draw upon outside business expertise to inform their
views. Outside experts are fixed claimants. That is, they earn a flat fee that is independent of
the success of the enterprise whose merits they are called upon to evaluate. Market players, on
the other hand, are residual claimants.132 If the firm is a success, they potentially stand to make
a great deal of money. This provides a much more potent incentive to make the right decision.
The difficulty with research in the experimental development phase, however, is that private
players are notable principally for their absence. While a smattering of angel investors play in
this domain, venture capitalists and strategic partners are usually absent (not to mention
mezzanine lenders, merchant bankers, and public capital markets). Thus, indirect funding such
as that supplied by the SR&ED credit is likely to be the optimal form of government
assistance.
130 Jenkins Report, ibid.
131 Jenkins Report, p.5-15.
132 Early stage investments are virtually always made by way of residual claims such as equity or instruments
convertible into equity, rather than by straight debt (i.e., a fixed claim).
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Where direct funding is used, I concur with the Jenkins Committee’s view that the government
should rely principally on private decision-makers. While the committee is somewhat short on
specifics, they advocate the use of a sidecar fund with angel investors. There is already
precedent for such funding; the federal government’s FedDev program for example, leverages
angel money through angels operating out of networks in southern Ontario.133
My proposal, however, is more sweeping than that of the Jenkins Committee. With savings
appropriated from the SR&ED, the Jenkins Report recommends that the government “direct
the Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC) to allocate a larger proportion of its
portfolio to start-up stage financing, preferably in the form of a “sidecar” fund with angel
investor groups.”134 Because of its heavily regional orientation, I would not recommend that
the BDC be the vehicle for effecting this goal. However, I would go further than the
Committee insofar as I would recommend that the government re-examine all of the $573
million in direct funding currently spent on experimental development with a view to re-
directing a material portion to angel sidecar funds and/or the SR&ED credit.
Given the relatively undeveloped state of Canada’s angel market, it would be unwise to rely
exclusively, or even principally on leveraging angel investments in experimental development.
The SR&ED credit should play the principal role.   
RESTRICT THE SR&ED TO SMALL FIRMS
In 2007 (the last year with complete data) about $1.3 billion in SR&ED credits was paid to
CCPCs, while $1.8 billion was paid to “large firms.”135 The average payment to a large firm
was $700,000,136 implying average SR&ED-eligible expenditures of somewhere on the order of
$3 million. Restricting SR&ED credits to CCPCs will immediately reduce the SR&ED budget
by about 60 percent — which is likely to result in far more substantial savings than
implementation of the Jenkins Panel’s recommendations. Restricting or eliminating the
SR&ED credit for large firms is thus an alternative means of financing an injection of money
into direct funding programs (if this is thought desirable), while hewing to the Panel’s revenue-
neutral mandate.  
Whether or not this would be a good idea on policy grounds cannot be determined without an
explicit evaluation of the relative costs and benefits of SR&ED funding for large firms
compared to small – in addition to an evaluation of the relative costs and benefits of direct
funding. However, it is noteworthy that large firms are on an entirely different part of the
economic spectrum from startups. Many will not only have customers and revenues, but
taxable profits. They will long since have crossed the Valley of Death and have a wide array of
available funding options, including venture capitalists, mezzanine lenders, merchant bankers,
and public capital markets. By contrast, as noted earlier, CCPCs typically have a limited array  
133 See http://www.feddevontario.gc.ca/eic/site/723.nsf/eng/home/. 
134 Jenkins Report, p.7-17.
135 Jenkins Report, Figure 6.3, p.6-7. The report does not define “large firm,” but it includes both large CCPCs and non-
CCPCs. See Jenkins, p. 3-10.
136 Ibid.
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of funding options; those situated in the Valley of Death may have none at all. If government
funding exists (at least in part) to correct market imperfections, these imperfections are much
more likely to exist in respect of small CCPCs than their larger counterparts. This makes a
prima facie case for preferring SR&ED funding for small, as opposed to large firms.
PART V: DIRECT VERSUS INDIRECT SUBSIDIZATION OF INNOVATIVE BUSINESS
What are Direct and Indirect Forms of Assistance?
The Jenkins panel adopts the OECD distinction between direct and indirect funding, as
follows:
The OECD (2010a, p. 76) defines direct and indirect funding as follows:
“Government direct R&D funding includes grants, loans and procurement.
Government indirect R&D funding includes tax incentives such as R&D tax
credits.” In practical terms, the main distinction between direct and indirect
support is that the latter is open-ended and is available to all firms, whereas
the former is limited in overall funding and is allocated by program
administrators to specific projects, industries or regions. Direct support can
therefore be targeted to specific areas, contrary to more neutral indirect
measures.137
In fact, direct programs come in many flavours. Appendix A indicates some — but by no
means all — of the pertinent variables, which can be combined into virtually limitless
permutations and combinations. Existing direct assistance programs differ not only in their
form of assistance and delivery mechanism, but in respect of who decides who will receive
funding, industry preference, regional preference, stage preference, grant size, target strategy,
and the identity of eligible recipients. Perhaps most importantly, they often differ in their
overarching goals.
The Varying Design Challenges of Different Types of Direct Assistance
Each of the variations in Appendix A presents policy makers with unique design challenges,
and these challenges arise both in relation to means and ends. For example, as noted above,
programs that aim at providing direct assistance to firms engaged in experimental design, with
the avowed purpose of enhancing the likelihood of a successful commercialization, suffer from
a high risk of selection error (i.e., choosing the wrong firms for funding). This suggests a
particular means for accomplishing the stated purpose: reliance on private investors as the
principal decision-makers. By contrast, programs that aim to increase employment or train
skilled workers lend themselves much more easily to in-house decision-making by bureaucrats. 
137 Jenkins Report, p.6-3.
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The fact that every box in Appendix A is currently representative of one or more granting
programs is the product of a multitude of factors, including policy, politics (e.g., lobbying by
particular industry interest groups) and path dependency (i.e., an element of randomness
deriving from how the winds of government and bureaucracy were blowing at the particular
time the program was created). A full review of direct assistance programs should attempt to
determine and evaluate these reasons. It should also, as the Jenkins Report suggests, seek to
develop measures of relative performance, without which policy makers are essentially
shooting in the dark in choosing how to deliver direct assistance.
In addition, it is unlikely that governments will ever choose a single overarching goal for their
direct assistance programs. Rather, it is probable that all of the goals indicated in Appendix A
(and very likely others) will continue to win political favour. This suggests that learned panels,
academics, and government officials can perform a useful service by suggesting superior forms
of organizational design to achieve each of the various goals that governments might choose to
pursue.
The Difficult Task of Picking Winners and Losers
One of the chief difficulties with direct assistance is that we simply cannot have much
confidence that government bureaucrats are well positioned to pick companies that are likely to
succeed in the commercialization sweepstakes. 
As illustrated in Appendices B and C, private investing by angels and venture capitalists is
quite different in many respects from investment by governmental entities.138 Successful
private investors have many years of experience working with high-tech start-ups. They
specialize in particular slices of the technology spectrum, in order to leverage their expertise.
The selection process is gruelling. Even after rigorously pre-screening prospects, they invest in
no more than three out of every hundred that survive the initial screen; the pickiest, perhaps
one out of every three hundred.139 In picking their investees, they not only draw on their
extensive in-house expertise, but enlist the aid of high-powered academics or external
consultants for a second opinion. By syndicating with other sophisticated angels or VCs, they
pool their expertise and minimize the probability of errors.
Once invested, they monitor their investments very closely. On average, a skilled private VC
manager will have only nine companies in his or her stable. He or she will be a director, will
communicate with the investee company at least weekly, and will play a key role in plotting
strategy. Even when the VC does not possess a majority of shares or nominate a majority of
directors, it will reserve contractual powers of control that give it the right to select management,
approve all major transactions, and to potentially veto any spending over a pre-set amount.
The VC or angel investor’s skill set extends to locating customers, suppliers, strategic partners,
distributors, marketing agents, investment bankers, other potential sources of funding, and suitable
legal, accounting, and other professional assistance. It also extends to executing a profitable exit
strategy, whether via an IPO, a sale of the entire firm to a third party, or by other means.
138 See generally Sahlman, supra, note 19; Thomas Hellmann and Manju Puri, “Venture Capital and the
Professionalization of Start-Up Firms: Empirical Evidence,” (2002), 57 Journal of Finance 169.
139 Conversation with a partner of Kleiner, Perkins.
33
Finally, because they hold an equity interest in the firm,140 the angel or VC investor has a
potent incentive to ensure that the firm is successful. Although a VC manager is merely an
intermediary investing other people’s money, it will habitually take 20 percent or more of the
increase in the value of the fund’s portfolio of firms for itself (the so-called carried interest).141
Despite this rigorous process of selection and grooming, it is clear that no more than 10 percent
of a given VC’s investments are home runs – and often only 1 or 2 out of a hundred.142 A
further 20-30 percent are write-offs, and the rest are what VCs often call the “walking
wounded” or the “living dead.”143
These figures paint a stark picture of just how difficult it is to pick high-tech winners and
losers. If the most skilled private sector investors do so in such a highly imperfect fashion,
what can we expect of unskilled and inexperienced government bureaucrats?
Internal Government Decision-Making
In fact, government bureaucrats lack virtually every aspect of the angel or VC’s skill set. Being
salaried employees, they lack the high-powered incentives of private investors. They often
have no particular technology expertise, whether specific or general, to help them evaluate
prospects. They lack the experiential database of the private investor to help them through the
process. They do not benefit from the pooling of knowledge that comes from syndicating with
others of their ilk, nor are they experts in crafting contracts with their investee firms to
incentivize their stable of entrepreneurs. Once the investment is made, they offer their investee
firms little or no value-add.
It is doubtful that the incentive problem is amenable to any easy solution, for a number of
reasons. The success or failure of a given venture will not be known for a period of time
ranging from two or three years to perhaps 10 years or more. However, bonus or merit pay
determinations for salaried employees are made on a yearly basis. There is thus a fundamental
mismatch between the duration of the investment and the employee’s evaluation period. 
Efforts to effect an ex-post settling up will be frustrated by the fact that many employees
involved in the decision-making process will have changed jobs or even left the government.
In addition, because of self-selection, government employees are likely to be more risk averse
than the average of the population. There will be little appetite for adjusting compensation ex-
post. Finally, the amount of money at stake, and the proportion that it bears to aggregate
income, are small when compared to what is on the line for private investors. Thus, even if an
effective ex-post settling-up mechanism could be devised, it would create very low-powered
incentives when compared to private investors.144
140 This includes convertible debt, or, more often, convertible preferred shares.
141 Sahlman, supra, note 19.
142 Cumming and MacIntosh, supra, note 12; John H. Cochrane, “The risk and return of venture capital” (2004), 75 J.
Fin. Econ. 3.
143 Cumming and MacIntosh, supra, note 30.
144 Ex-post settling up also presents challenging tax issues. For example, the ex-post evaluation process may be so long
as to exceed the maximum period during which an income tax return may be adjusted.
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Outsourced Evaluation
Outsourcing the evaluation and/or advice function, as some programs (such as IRAP) do,145
bolsters the skill set of the decision-makers. However, it entirely fails to address the incentive
problem, since external advisors are fixed rather than residual claimants. Nor can it replicate
the experience, breadth of pooled knowledge, or business savvy of private investors. 
Academic Peer Review
As noted earlier, academic peer review works very effectively in the evaluation of basic and
applied research.146 While it is also a useful adjunct to the evaluation of experimental
development projects, a bevy of business issues beyond the competence of academics also
come into play.  
Co-Investment
The Jenkins Report’s preferred mechanism for direct assistance is co-funding arrangements with
angel groups and VCs.147 In particular, the panel recommends that the Business Development
Corporation (BDC) allocate a larger proportion of its portfolio to start-up financing, and that this
should “preferably [be] in the form of a ‘sidecar’ fund with angel investor groups,”148 in which
the angels contribute at least 50 percent of the funds (and presumably pick the investee firms).
This form of direct investment neatly sidesteps some (although not all) of the perils associated
with government bureaucrats directly picking winners and losers.
The panel’s concern about a dearth of later-stage expansion money is addressed by a similar
recommendation, in which government funds are to be co-invested with VCs. The report states
that “the market should determine the allocation of financing. Governments should co-invest with
private venture capitalists and allow the private investors to determine the investment strategy.”149
In general, this is a solid foundation upon which to base direct funding. If anything, however,
the Panel’s recommendation is too modest. Rather than allocating funds from a scaled-back
SR&ED to the BDC to co-invest in angel and venture capital funds, the government should
ensure that the common theme of its direct investment in experimental development is reliance
on co-investment mechanisms. This will, however, require that the government decide whether
it will invest in funds alongside private investors, or in particular projects.  
145 See e.g., http://www.nrc-cnrc.gc.ca/eng/ibp/irap/about/advisors.html, discussing the backgrounds and qualifications
of IRAP’s industrial technology advisors.
146 Although effective, it is far from perfect. Academic review is sometimes compromised by non-objectivity, since
academics in the same or closely cognate fields are natural competitors for promotions, grants, recognition, awards,
etc. Even though peer review is typically conducted on a no-names basis, it is frequently not difficult for an
academic with a knowledge of the literature and his/her peers’ areas of research to guess at the likely identity of the
applicant. 




FUND-LEVEL CO-INVESTMENT: THE YOZMA MODEL
The Jenkins panel’s support of co-investment appears to have been inspired by the notable
success of Israel’s Yozma program. The Israelis virtually built their thriving VC industry from
the ground up by contributing 40 percent of the capital to funds otherwise capitalized and
controlled by foreign VCs. In these funds, private investors are given the option of
repurchasing the government’s share at a stated price within five years. Of the 10 funds
initially set up, nine exercised their buyout options — and there is presently something like
$10 billion under management in Israeli VC funds.150 The Yozma template has caught on like
wildfire in various OECD countries and elsewhere around the world.151
The growth of the venture capital industry in Israel, however, was given a kick-start by the
arrival of some 750,000 scientists, engineers, and physicians from Russia, as a result of the
break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991.152 As a consequence, Israel has more scientists and
engineers per capita than any other country in the world.153 In addition, the Israeli
government’s considerable military expenditures, like those in the U.S., have made a material
contribution to the growth of Israel’s high-tech industries.
The modus operandi of a Yozma-style fund is that it lowers the cost of capital for venture
capitalists. However, this will not always be of benefit to the local venture capital industry. If
the supply of high net present value (NPV) investee firms is limited, the effect of lowering the
VC’s cost of capital will be to induce the VC to invest in relatively low-quality projects that
would not otherwise have been funded — a payoff of questionable value. If, however, there is
an abundance of high NPV projects, the VC’s choice of investee firms will not change; it will
always be better off choosing the highest NPV projects available. In this case, the primary
effect of government subsidization will be to enhance the profits of the venture capitalist,
without substantially improving the supply of venture capital in the target market.
It would thus seem that a Yozma-style model is justified only if the government believes that
VCs are unaware of high-net present-value projects available in the target market and seeks to
draw the attention of VCs to these opportunities. It would appear that the latter motive inspired
the Yozma program in Israel. The Israeli government sought to attract foreign venture
capitalists into the Israeli market, hoping that they would stay once they got there. This appears
to have happened. Whether Canada would benefit from such an approach, however, is unclear.
American venture capitalists are already investing heavily in Canada, and there does not appear
to be any reason to suppose that they fail to appreciate the nature of the market opportunities
available here.
Another potentially negative consequence of Yozma-style funding is that funds receiving the
benefit of government subsidization, having a lower cost of capital, will routinely outbid other
VCs in the target market. This may have the perverse effect of driving non-favoured VCs from
the market, potentially reducing, rather than increasing the aggregate supply of venture capital.
150 See http://www.iva.co.il/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=64&Itemid=80). 
151 Jenkins Report, p.7-19.
152 Dan Senor and Saul Singer, Start-up Nation: The Story of Israel’s Economic Miracle (Twelve: 2009); Debbie
Buchwald, “Israel’s High-Tech Boom,” II(2) inFocus (Summer 2008), available at
http://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/221/israels-high-tech-boom. 
153 Senor and Singer, ibid; Buchwald, ibid.
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There is thus reason to believe that the Canadian venture capital market could suffer damage
from a Yozma-style program in the long term if: i) there is no shortage of high-NPV projects in
Canada; ii) there is no information asymmetry such that foreign VCs are unaware of these
opportunities; and iii) foreign venture capitalists are heavily favoured by the Yozma-style
program. If all of these conditions hold, then a Yozma-style program will simply subsidize US
VCs who would have been investing in Canada in any case. Canadian VCs, with a higher cost
of capital, will be driven from the market. When the program is terminated, only US VCs will
be left standing; there will be little or no domestic venture capital industry. 
One way of addressing this issue is to insist that recipient funds be VC syndicates with one or
more (or perhaps a majority of) Canadian VC partners. This would have the added benefit of
exposing Canadian VCs to their generally more sophisticated American counterparts, with a
resultant transfer of skills that would benefit the Canadian industry in the long run. By
comparison, restricting a Yozma-style program to Canadian VCs could have the unfortunate
affect of driving more sophisticated US VCs from the Canadian market, reducing the pool of
smart capital available to Canadian entrepreneurs and obviating the benefit of skills transfer.
Thus, if the government chooses to adopt the Yozma approach, it would be better to insist that
recipient syndicates consist of both Canadian and US VCs.
PROJECT-BY-PROJECT CO-INVESTMENT
Fund-level investment is not likely to work very effectively in connection with earlier-stage
investments with angel investors. While groups of angel investors often participate in Dragon’s
Den-style vetting of investment projects, investment decisions are typically made on an
individual basis. Thus, government co-investment must necessarily be made on a project-by-
project basis. This approach will also work for later stage investments alongside venture
capitalists or strategic partners. 
There are in fact many programs that already adopt this approach, such as the federal
government’s FedDev Ontario program154 and SD Tech Fund.155 Such programs have the
benefit of allowing well-motivated and skilled private investors to choose which firms receive
funding, and make eminently good sense.
The BDC Model: Cloning Private Investment
The federal government’s Business Development Corporation operates on a rather unique
model that avoids some of the more difficult issues associated with direct government support
of innovation. BDC is organized as a crown corporation with an independent board of
directors. As of March 31, 2011, BDC had $18.4 billion under administration.156 Most of this
was in the form of debt financing and holdings of asset-backed securities.157 However, BDC 
154 See http://www.feddevontario.gc.ca/eic/site/723.nsf/eng/home. 
155 See http://www.sdtc.ca/index.php?page=sdtech-funding-niche&hl=en_CA. 
156 BDC Annual Report 2011, p.9.  
157 Of 3,245 firms supported in 2011, only 365 were investments at the start-up or development stages. Ibid. p.23.
maintains a wholly owned subsidiary — BDC Venture Capital (BDC-VC) — that replicates
many features of a private venture capital fund. In particular, BDC-VC hires managers with
private sector backgrounds, and rewards its venture managers with a carried interest on the net
asset value of the portfolio.158
BDC-VC does not, however, replicate all of the advantages of a private fund. It is not, for
example, organized as a limited partnership with a limited lifespan. Although, as a crown
corporation, it is relatively immune from political interference, it owes its existence to an act of
Parliament,159 is wholly owned by the government of Canada, finances its activities by
borrowing from the government, reports on its activities to the government yearly, is subject to
a special examination by the Auditor General of Canada at least once every 10 years, and is
ultimately accountable to Parliament via the Minister of Industry. Thus, it is potentially subject
to political pressures not experienced by private funds. This may be the reason why the BDC
apparently exhibits strong regional preferences in its funding activities.
BDC reports that the fair value of the venture capital portfolio held by BDC-VC was $407.8
million as of March 31, 2011, with total venture commitments of $725.2, consisting of $416.5
of direct investments and $308.7 committed to investment funds. BDC Venture Capital thus
engages in direct investment as well as acting as a fund of funds.
Overall, BDC’s return on equity in 2011 was 9.5 percent; the simple arithmetic average for the
past five years is 5.5 percent — well in excess of the LSVCC industry average as well as
average returns to Canadian private independent funds.160 However, a more telling comparison
is with BDC Venture Capital, which has not fared as well. From 2007 to 2011, it incurred
losses of $33.6 million, $82.8 million, $106.3 million, $74.1 million, and $18.6 million.161
These are comparable to or greater than the losses experienced by LSVCCs and private funds.
Thus, the jury remains out on the efficacy of this experiment in government-sponsored venture
capital.
The Fund-of-Funds Model: Teralys and BDC
As noted earlier, Solidarity, the Caisse, and Investissement Québec have essentially vacated the
venture capital field, collectively entrusting $1.3 billion to Teralys, a private fund-of-funds
manager. BDC plays a similar role: of $725.2 million in funding and funding commitments (as
of March 31, 2011), nearly 43 percent was placed with other venture capital funds.
158 Conversation with Jean-René Halde, President and CEO, BDC, December 7, 2011.
159 The BDC was initially incorporated by an act of Parliament on Dec. 20, 1974, as the Federal Business Development
Bank. It is currently governed by the Business Development Bank of Canada Act, S.C. 1995, c.28.
160 According to the CVCA, the net 10-year return realized by private independent funds is -3.1 percent, and the net
five-year return is 0.2 percent. See
http://www.cvca.ca/files/News/Q2_11_CVCA_Performance_Public_Release_Private_Independent.pdf. Note,
however, that the BDC figure is reported as a gross return, while the CVCA reports the returns of private
independent funds on a net basis.
161 BDC Annual Report 2011, p.123.
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The fund-of-funds approach has much to recommend it. Of all possible mechanisms for
spiriting government funds to innovative companies, it comes closest to full privatization.
However, since governments are ultimately providing the capital — and thus furnishing their
chosen managers with a potentially handsome living — it would be foolish to think that the
managers will be completely exempt from political pressures, whether the manager is a
governmental entity such as BDC, or an external manager such as Teralys. In addition, the
aggregate management fees are higher than in respect of direct investments, since the fund-of-
funds manager charges a carried interest on top of the carried interest charged by the investee
funds. This may be a small price to pay, however, for entrusting government funds to
individuals who have both the qualifications and incentives to invest the funds wisely.
PART VI: TAX TREATMENT OF STRATEGIC DISPOSITIONS
Academic commentary has established the pivotal importance of profitable exit mechanisms in
encouraging angel and venture capital investment.162 As indicated above in Figure 2, there are
two primary exit mechanisms: an initial public offering, and a sale of the entire firm to a
strategic acquirer (an M&A exit). The vast bulk of acquirers in Canadian M&A exits are
American companies.
When an American firm acquires a Canadian company engaged in innovative research, it will
often reincorporate the company in the United States, transfer the firm’s operations south of the
border, or both. The tax burden of selling to a US firm can be considerably greater than that
associated with selling to a Canadian firm, distorting the choice of exit vehicle and/or exit
partner.
Assume that the sale is effected via a sale of shares. No matter to whom the firm is sold, the
sellers (i.e., the early stage investors) will pay capital gains tax on the increase in the value of
their shares. However, if the firm is sold to a Canadian entity, the firm itself pays no tax.
By contrast, if the firm is sold to an American acquirer, and the acquirer either reincorporates
the firm in the US or moves the assets to the US, a deemed disposition of the firm’s assets
occurs, on which the firm pays a blend of capital gains and income tax. This materially reduces
the US acquirer’s after-tax gain from effecting the acquisition. This in turn reduces the price
that the acquirer is willing to pay to purchase the firm, which will commensurately reduce the
profit earned by the Canadian sellers.
It may be tempting to believe that, as a matter of public policy, it is better to keep innovative
assets in Canada, and hence to design a tax system that encourages strategic sales to be
effected to Canadian acquirers. However, the reality is that the pool of US acquirers is vastly
greater than that of Canadian acquirers. To the extent that US acquirers are allowed low-cost
access to Canadian targets, this will tend to increase the returns to innovative activity by
Canadians, and commensurately increase the quantum of innovation. 
162 Cumming and MacIntosh, supra, note 12; Gilson and Black, supra, note 91.
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PART VII: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
It is time to end the subsidies to LSVCC funds. LSVCCs have generated poor returns,
displaced more effective private funds, and in net, have impoverished, rather than enhanced the
Canadian venture capital industry.  
Private investors and strategic partners do not usually participate in the funding of basic and
applied research, leaving government to occupy the field. Because of the importance of basic
and applied research in the innovation ecosystem, governments should continue to provide
generous funding in these domains, based primarily on academic peer review. In the realm of
experimental development, the primary emphasis should be placed on indirect assistance via
the SR&ED credit, supplemented by co-investment with angel (and other) investors.  
Later stage direct investment should be based, as the Jenkins Committee suggests, on a co-
investment model. The report is vague, however, on the nature of this co-investment. Care
should be taken before adopting a Yozma-style co-investment model. The success of the Yozma
program may be the product of a number of factors that are unique to Israel and which do not
exist in Canada. There is a danger that a Yozma-style model could actually damage, rather than
assist the Canadian venture capital industry. It may be better to proceed on a project-by-project
basis in co-funding venture-backed firms.
Limiting the SR&ED credit paid to CCPCs (but not larger firms) to labour costs, as suggested
by the Jenkins Committee, is not likely to result in materially lower application costs for
entrepreneurs. It will, however, tilt the playing field in favour of firms with a high
labour/capital ratio, create anti-competitive barriers to entry, and penalize firms engaged in
manufacturing.
Many of the small firms (typically CCPCs) that currently benefit from SR&ED funding are
engaged in cutting-edge experimental development that forms the roots of the innovation
ecosystem. While such research can be expected to have a relatively high failure rate, the
paucity of funding sources available to early-stage firms renders the SR&ED’s shotgun
approach to funding both warranted and necessary. Many firms engaged in experimental
development inhabit a region commonly referred to as the Valley of Death — the early-stage
commercialization landscape in which government funding is either absent or ineffective, and
private funding largely AWOL. Cutting back on SR&ED funding could thus inflict grave
damage on government efforts to spur innovation — no matter how much money is poured
into later-stage commercializations.
The Jenkins Committee’s antipathy to the SR&ED is based, in part, on an overstatement of the
target inefficiency of the SR&EDs, both in absolute terms, and relative to direct investment.
The Committee draws upon research by the Department of Finance that shows that only two
percent of firms receiving SR&ED funding become large firms within 5 years of incorporation.
The data from which this figure derives are extracted from the post-bubble 2000-2004 period
in which returns to small high-tech firms were uncharacteristically poor. Thus, the two percent
in five years figure is likely to be unrepresentative of overall growth rates of firms receiving
SR&ED assistance. Comparative data gleaned from the cohort of Silicon Valley firms founded
in the year 2000 do not reveal a substantially different growth rate, even though these
companies were founded in the world’s leading nursery of high-tech firms, and had the benefit
of massive (and record-setting) venture capital financing. 
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The two percent in five years metric also understates the period of time necessary to bring
most high-tech ventures to fruition. It often takes 10 or more years to do so, and many
companies that have gone on to great commercial success — such as RIM and E-Ink — were
in existence for many years before becoming successful. Added to this, many successful firms
— such as those that ultimately licence their technology or are bought out in an M&A exit —
will never grow into larger firms.
Recent research suggests that advanced manufacturing is likely to play a vital role in Canada’s
innovation ecosystem. Advanced manufacturing consists mostly of platform technologies such
as nanotechnology, chemistry and biology, which have broad applications across virtually all
industrial sectors. The availability of advanced manufacturing facilities offers start-up firms a
domestic manufacturing option. This will tend to ensure that successful high-tech firms do not
move jobs or production offshore when they reach a scale-up inflection point, allowing
foreigners to capture the benefits of domestic investment in innovation.
There is little evidence on how many advanced manufacturing firms Canada currently has, or
what proportion of direct government funding reaches such firms. However, many such firms
will only adventitiously fall into current funding silos. It is far more likely that these firms will
receive support under the SR&ED program. The government should re-examine its portfolio of
assistance programs with a view to ensuring that this sector receives suitable support.
Finally, the federal income tax legislation should be amended so that the sale of an innovative
firm to a foreign entity results only in a tax burden on the Canadian sellers that is comparable
to the tax burden that would arise if the firm was sold to a Canadian acquirer.
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APPENDIX B: COMPARATIVE SKILLS TABLE
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